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vABSTRACT
This thesis introduces some general frameworks for studying problems in de-
cision theory. The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I develop
general mathematical frameworks and tools to explore different decision the-
oretic phenomena. Second, I apply my developed frameworks and tools in
different topics of Microeconomics and Decision Theory.
Chapter 1 introduces a notion of the classifier, to represent the different classes
of data revealed through some observations. I present a general model of clas-
sification, notion of complexity, and how a complicated classification procedure
can be generated through some simpler classification procedures.
My goal is to show how an individual’s complex behavior can be derived from
some simple underlying heuristics. In this chapter, I model a classifier (as a
general model for decision making) that based on observing some data points
classifies them into different categories with a set of different labels. The only
assumption for my model is that whenever a data point is in two categories,
there should be an additional category representing the intersection of the
two categories. First, I derive a duality result similar to the duality in con-
vex geometry. Then, using my result, I find all representations of a complex
classifier by aggregating simpler forms of classifiers. For example, I show how
a complex classifier can be represented by simpler classifiers with only two
categories (similar to a single linear classifier in a neural network). Finally,
I show an application in the context of dynamic choice behaviors. Notably,
I use my model to reinterpret the seminal works by Kreps (1979) and Dekel,
Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) on representing preference ordering over menus
with a subjective state space. I also show the connection between the notion
of the minimal subjective state space in economics with my proposed notion
of complexity of a classifier.
In Chapter 2, I provide a general characterization of recursive methods of
aggregation and show that recursive aggregation lies behind many seemingly
different results in economic theory. Recursivity means that the aggregate
outcome of a model over two disjoint groups of features is a weighted average
of the outcome of each group separately.
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This chapter makes two contributions. The first contribution is to pin down
any aggregation procedure that satisfies my definition of recursivity. The result
unifies aggregation procedures across many different economic environments,
showing that all of them rely on the same basic result. The second contribution
is to show different extensions of the result in the context of belief formation,
choice theory, and welfare economics.
In the context of belief formation, I model an agent who predicts the true
state of nature, based on observing some signals in her information structure.
I interpret each subset of signals as an event in her information structure. I
show that, as long as the information structure has a finite cardinality, my
weighted averaging axiom is the necessary and sufficient condition for the
agent to behaves as a Bayesian updater. This result answers the question
raised by Shmaya and Yariv (2007), regarding finding a necessary and sufficient
condition for a belief formation process to act as a Bayesian updating rule.
In the context of choice theory, I consider the standard theory of discrete
choice. An agent chooses randomly from a menu. The outcome of my model
is the average choice (mean of the distribution of choices) rather than the
entire distribution of choices. Average choice is easier to report and obtain
than the entire distribution. However, an average choice does not uniquely
reveal the underlying distribution of choices. In this context, I show that (1)
it is possible to uniquely extract the underlying distribution of choices as long
as the average choice satisfies weighted averaging axiom, and (2) there is a
close connection between my weighted averaging axiom and the celebrated
Luce (or Logit) model of discrete choice.
Chapter 3 is about the aggregation of the preference orderings of individuals
over a set of alternatives. The role of an aggregation rule is to associate with
each group of individuals another preference ordering of alternatives, repre-
senting the group’s aggregated preference. I consider the class of aggregation
rules satisfying an extended Pareto axiom. Extended Pareto means that when-
ever we partition a group of individuals into two subgroups, if both subgroups
prefer one alternative over another (as indicated by their aggregated prefer-
ences), then the aggregated preference ordering of the union of the subgroups
also prefers the first alternative over the second one.
I show that (1) the extended Pareto is equivalent to my weighted averaging
axiom, and (2) I derive a generalization of Harsanyi’s (1955) famous theo-
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rem on Utilitarianism. Harsanyi considers a single profile of individuals and a
variant of Pareto to obtain Utilitarianism. However, in my approach, I parti-
tion a profile into smaller groups. Then, I aggregate the preference ordering of
these smaller groups using the extended Pareto. Hence, I obtain Utilitarianism
through this consistent form of aggregation. As a result, in my representation,
the weight associated with each individual appears in all sub-profiles that con-
tain her.
In another application, I find the class of extended Pareto social welfare func-
tions. My result has a positive nature, compared to the claims by Kalai and
Schmeidler (1977) and Hylland (1980) that the negative conclusion of Arrow’s
theorem holds even with vN-M preferences.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I derive a simple subjective conditional expectation the-
ory of state-dependent preferences. In many applications such as models for
buying health insurance, the standard assumption about the independence of
the utility and the set of states is not a plausible one. Hence, I derive a model
in which the main force behind the separation of beliefs and state-dependent
utility comes from the extended Pareto condition. Moreover, I show that, as
long as the model satisfies my strong minimal agreement condition, we can
uniquely separate beliefs from the state-dependent utility.
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1C h a p t e r 1
A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF CLASSIFIERS;
REPRESENTATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a mathematical framework to study the proper-
ties of classifiers. Our paper defines the notion of classifiers, complexity of a
classifier, and representation of a complex classifier through simpler classifiers.
Consider a data set in which each data points has different labels. Labels of
data sets allow us to classify data points into different classes, each class is
associated with the data points having some specific labels.
However, in many applications and data sets, we observe a classification rather
than the underlying reasons that give us the observed classification. Each class
may represent some data points with some properties. How can we understand
how these classes have been generated? What are the possible simple criteria
that classify the data set into the observed set of classes? If we have access to
simple procedures that can divide data set into two classes (binary classifiers),
then how many of them are needed to generate the same classification as the
one observed in our data sets?
Our paper presents a framework to answer all these questions. Generally
speaking, we try to understand the underlying structure of a complex classifi-
cation procedure.
In the Machine Learning literature, a neural network is built from a set of
simple linear classifiers. Given a data set and a set of labels, a researcher can
add many linear classifiers to build a large neural network that can shatter
data points to the correct classes. More generally, a researcher can combine
many different functions to form a complex function with lots of parameters
to shatter the set of data points into the correct classes. One of our goals is
to do the same in our abstract setup without any notion of a norm, distance,
or even a topology.
Our paper tries to formalize these ideas through some new characterization of
closure operators. Our results have the same intuitions that are behind the
2duality of convex sets and support functionals in convex analysis.
The road starts with presenting some basic terms and primitives from abstract
convex geometry literature. Then, we formally define our notion of classifiers
using some motivational examples. In Section 1.4 we present our main char-
acterizations of classifiers. Then, we discuss different notions of complexity
associated with a classifier. We finish the section by providing a result on
how to find the minimal decomposition of a classifier into simple classification
procedures.
Finally, in a self-contained Section 1.5, we provide some applications of our
results in the context of dynamic choice. Notably, our results generalize and
shed some new lights on seminal papers by Kreps (1979), Dekel, Lipman, and
Rustichini (2001), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) regarding the representa-
tion of decision-maker’s preference ordering over a set of menus.
Our paper provides some new techniques and frameworks that have not been
fully developed and used in the economics literature. We think there are many
following questions, results, and consequences in decision theory.
1.2 Primitives and Axioms
The followings are standard definitions. Let X be a finite set of alternatives.
A set A Ď X is a menu of alternatives. We denote the set of all menus of X
by 2X . A binary relation Á on X is a weak order on X, if it is transitive
(@x, y, z P X if x Á y and y Á z then x Á z), and complete (@x, y P X whether
x Á y or y Á x); it is partial order on X, if it is reflexive (@x P X x Á x),
transitive, and anti-symmetric (@x, y P X if x Á y and y Á x then x “ y). A
partial order which is complete is called total order or linear order .
Let pX,Áq be a partially ordered set and Y Ď X. We say that pY,Áq is a
chain if it is a totally ordered set; it is an anti-chain if no two distinct
element of Y are comparable. An element x P X is said to be an upper
bound of Y if x Á a for every a P Y . We denote the lowest upper bound
or join of Y (if it exists) by
Ž
Y . Similarly, we denote the greatest lower
bound or meet of Y by
Ź
Y .
A partially ordered set pX,Áq is called a lattice if each x, y P X has a join
and a meet, denoted by x _ y and x ^ y respectively. Let pX,Áq be a lattice
and Y Ď X. We say that Y is a sublattice of pX,Áq if x _ y, x ^ y P Y for
all x, y P Y .
3The following two definitions are the main definitions of our paper.
Definition 1. A closure operator on X is a map f : 2X Ñ 2X that satisfies
the following properties:
1. extensivity : A Ď fpAq and fpHq “ H.
2. idempotence : fpfpAqq “ fpAq.
3. monotonicity : A Ď B implies fpAq Ď fpBq.
There are two special closure operators. We define the identity operator as
the closure operator I : 2X Ñ 2X such that IpAq “ A for every A P 2X . The
trivial closure operator is defined as the closure operator f : 2X Ñ 2X
such that fpAq “ X for every nonempty A P 2X .
Definition 2. A set A Ď X is closed with respect to a closure operator
f : 2X Ñ 2X , if fpAq “ A. We denote the set of all closed sets with respect to
the closure operator f on X as SpX, fq.
There is a connection between the set of closed operators and the set of menus
that are closed under intersection. We do not know who first noticed this
observation 1. However, it is a known fact in topology. We are using the
following lemma throughout our paper.
Lemma 1. Let f : 2X Ñ 2X be a closure operator on X, then the set of closed
sets SpX, fq is closed under intersection and contains H and X. Moreover, if
S is any subset of 2X which is closed under intersection and contains H and
X, there is a unique closure operator fS : 2
X Ñ 2X such that SpX, fSq “ S.
Proof. The proof is simple. However, to be complete we add it here. Let
A,B P SpX, fq and C “ A X B. We need to show that C P SpX, fq. If
C “ H, by extensivity we are done. Otherwise, monotonicity, idempotence,
and closedness of A,B imply that fpCq Ă fpAq X fpBq “ A X B “ C. Thus
by extensivity we get that fpCq “ C.
1In the context of convex geometry, the result has been noticed in Edelman and Jamison
(1985).
4For the other direction, assume that S Ă 2X is closed under intersection and





It is straightforward to check that f is a closure operator with SpX, fq “ S.
The above lemma shows that by understanding the set of closed sets, we can
uniquely understand the closure operator associated with it.
Finally, given any closure operator f : 2X Ñ 2X , the set SpX, fq endowed with
the meet and join operators A^B “ AXB and A_B “ fpAYBq becomes
a lattice which is bounded by H and X.
Remark 1. The basic concepts of abstract convex geometry and combinatorial
convex hull operator are given in Edelman et al. (1985). Any closure operator
f : 2X Ñ 2X with anti-exchange property defines a combinatorial convex
hull operator . We say that f satisfies the anti-exchange property if given
any closed set A and two unequal points x, y P XzA, then x P fpAYyq implies
that y R fpAY xq.
A combinatorial convex hull operator is the abstraction of the regular convex
hull operator in the Euclidean spaces. Any closed set of a combinatorial convex
hull operator defines a convex set. An element x P X is said to be an extreme
point of A if fpAzxq ‰ fpAq. The anti-exchange property captures the idea
that if y is an extreme point of fpAYyq and if x R fpAq and x P fpAYyq then
x cannot be an extreme point. In other words, any convex set can be generated
using the set of extreme points inside the set. This is the combinatorial version
of the Krein–Milman theorem 2.
The connection between the combinatorial convex hull operators and the path
independent choice functions has been studied in Koshevoy (1999). He shows
that for any combinatorial convex hull operator, the extreme point operator
(the set of extreme points of a set with respect to the convex hull operator),
satisfies the heritage and outcast properties. He shows that the reverse
2Let X be a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space. Also, let A be a compact
convex subset of X. Then, the theorem states that A is the closed convex hull of its extreme
points.
5is also possible, which means that given a choice function with heritage and
outcast properties, we can derive the associated convex hull operator.
In a nutshell, the heritage property states that if A Ď B, then extpAq Ě
extpBq X A. This property is just the α property of Sen (1977).
The outcast property states that if extpAq Ď B Ď A, then extpAq “ extpBq.
This property is the weaker form of property β of Sen (1977).
These properties mentioned above have been well studied in choice theory.
The connection between convex hull operator and a choice function through
extreme point operator allows for connecting propositions in the literature of
both choice theory and abstract convex geometry.
In particular, a characterization of a combinatorial convex hull operator through
a set of primitive orderings has been studied in Richter and Rubinstein (2018).
Using their representation, they propose a notion of competitive equilibrium
in an abstract environment.
A part of the goal of this paper is to generalize the work of Richter et al. (2018)
for the class of closure operators. We show that the closure operator has a
simple representation similar to the representation of the regular Euclidean
convex hull operator through continuous linear operators. Moreover, we show
how to find an additive representation of a decision-maker’s preference ordering
of a set of menus with some underlying revealed closure operator (we explain
the notion in section 1.5). The representation sheds light on the connection
between the seminal works of Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(2001) regarding the representation of preferences over menus.
As mentioned before, the closure operator is a generalization of the convex
hull operator. Before going to the details of our characterization, we present
a simple environment that captures our interpretations of closure operators.
We derive our results for our proposed environment.
1.3 Labeling Correspondences and Classifiers
Let X denote the set of data points. A finite set L represents a set of labels.
A labeling correspondence on X using the set of labels L is a set value
function Φ : X Ñ L that associates with each data point x P X a subset of
labels Φpxq.
6Given a labeling correspondence Φ : X Ñ L, we define a classifier as a
function f : 2X Ñ 2X with fpAq “ tx|x P X, ŞyPA Φpyq Ď Φpxqu for every
A Ď X.
The interpretation of a labeling correspondence is straightforward. It attaches
a set of labels to each data point. We interpret each label as a single feature
or property attached to each data point. Hence, attaching two different labels
l1, l2 P L to a data point x P X, Φpxq “ tl1, l2u, is interpreted as if the data
point x has both of those properties.
To understand the definition of a classifier, assume that the classifier f , asso-
ciated with a labeling correspondence Φ. Given a data point x Ď X, Φpxq is
the set of all labels associated with the point x. To find the set of data points
that are in the same class (or category) as x, we need to consider all data
points that have at least all the labels of the data points x. This is precisely
the definition of fpxq.
More generally, for a given set of data points A Ď X, fpAq is the set of all
data points that at least have all the labels that are in common with all points
in A. The idea is that if a decision-maker wants to find all data points that
are in the same class as the observed data points in A (without any other
information), she should consider all points fpAq.
Remark 2. Notice that any classifier related to a labeling function is a closure
operator. The extensivity and monotonicity properties are simple to check.
To check the idempotence, just notice that by monotonicity fpAq Ď fpfpAqq.
Hence, we only need to show that fpfpAqq Ď fpAq.
Assume that x P fpfpAqq. By the definition of f , we have ŞyPfpAq Φpyq Ď Φpxq.
Again, by the definition of f , we know that for every y P fpAq we haveŞ




yPfpAq Φpyq Ď Φpxq. Thus, x P fpAq.
As a result, f satisfies the idempotence property.
As a result of the above remark, the set of closed sets, SpX, fq, represents all
possible different classes of data points, and fpAq is the smallest class that
contains A as a subset. By considering Lemma 1, we know that the set of
classes is closed under the intersection. Moreover, there is a lattice structure
associated with the labeling correspondence.
To understand both concepts, we provide the following example.
7ta, b, c, du
ta, b, du
ta, bu ta, cu
tau tbu tcu tdu
H
Figure 1.1: The lattice associated with the labeling correspondence Φ.
Example 1. Consider a set of four data points X “ ta, b, c, du. The set of
labels is defined as L “ thuman, cat, black,white, female,male, caru. Assume
that the labeling correspondence Φ : X Ñ L is as follows:
Φpaq “ thuman, black, femaleu
Φpbq “ thuman, black,maleu
Φpcq “ tcat,white, femaleu
Φpdq “ tcar, blacku
The classifier associated with the above labeling correspondence has eight
classes. Class1={a} associated with the labels {human, black, female}, Class2={b}
associated with the labels {human, black, male}, Class3={c} associated with
the labels {cat, white, female}, Class4={d} associated with labels {car, black},
Class5={a,b} associated with the labels {human, black}, Class6={a,b,d} as-
sociated with the labels {black}, Class7={a,c} associated with the labels
{female}, and the last class is Class8={a,b,c,d} associated with all data points
in the set X.
Figure 1.1 depicts the structure of the classifier and the associated lattice
structure.
It is important to notice that we can have another interpretation of a classifier
through the set of classes. Consider the set of data points X, and a set of
8classes or categories S Ď 2X . Let x P X be in two classes A,B P S, which
means that it has both properties of the classes A and B. Then, there should
be another class C P S, with both properties of the classes A and B, such
that x P C. The class, C, represents the data points with both properties
of class A and class B. Thus, with the interpretation mentioned above, the
set of classes should be closed under intersection. Moreover, we assume that
there is a trivial class X, which represents the set of all data points with every
possible property. Thus, through the eye of Lemma 1, there is a unique closure
operator f with SpX, fq “ S.
As a result of the above interpretation, we can define a labeling function
Φ : X Ñ S, which takes its labels from the set of classes S. For each data
points x P X, let Φpxq “ ts| s P S, x P su. Thus, for each data point x P X, Φ
attaches all the labels of each class that contains x. Interestingly, the classifier
associated with the labeling correspondence Φ is exactly the unique closure
operator f such that SpX, fq “ S.
We summarize the above observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let X be a set of data points. We have the followings:
1. Let L be a set of labels and Φ : X Ñ L be a labeling correspondence.
Then, the unique classifier f : 2X Ñ 2X associated with Φ (as defined
above) is a closure operator. Moreover the set of classes are closed under
intersection.
2. Let f : X Ñ X be a closure operator on X. Then, there exists a set of
labels L, and a labeling correspondence Φ : X Ñ L such that the classifier
associated with Φ is f . Moreover, one choice of L and Φ is achieved by
defining L “ SpX, fq and Φ : X Ñ L with Φpxq “ ts| s P SpX, fq, x P
su.
Proof. We have already proved the first part in remark 2. To prove the second
part, we define L “ SpX, fq and Φ : X Ñ L with Φpxq “ ts| s P SpX, fq, x P
su. Based on the proof of the first part, we know that the classifier g : 2X Ñ 2X
associated with Φ is a closure operator. Thus, we only need to prove that
g “ f .
First, we prove that gpAq Ď fpAq for every A P 2X . Let A P 2X and x P gpAq.
By the definition of g,
Ş
yPA Φpyq Ď Φpxq. Then, by definition of Φ, we have
9ts P SpX, fq| @y P A, y P su Ď ts P SpX, fq| x P su. Hence, if s P SpX, fq with
A Ď s, then x P s.
Now, consider the set s “ fpAq. By monotonicity of the closure operator we
have A Ď s. Since s P SpX, fq and A Ď s, then we obtain that x P s. This
means that x P fpAq. Thus, gpAq Ď fpAq for every A P 2X .
For the other side, we need to show that fpAq Ď gpAq for every A P 2X . Let
A P 2X and x P fpAq. By the definition of Φ and g, it remains to show thatŞ
yPA Φpyq “ ts P SpX, fq|A Ď su Ď Φpxq “ ts P SpX, fq| x P su. Thus, it
remains to show that if s P SpX, fq and A Ď s, then we would have x P s.
However, f is monotonic and s is a closed set respect to f . Thus, since A Ď s
then, fpAq Ď fpsq “ s. Moreover, we assumed that x P fpAq. As a result, we
have x P s.
In the second part of the above proposition, the labeling correspondence is
not unique. However, using the second part of the proposition, we can get one
choice of labeling correspondence.
Consider the classifier associated with Example 1. There are eight classes other
thanH. Let define L “ tClass1, . . . ,Class8u. Using the result of Proposition 1,





The above labeling correspondence is different that the original one in the
example. However, they both have the same classifier with the same set of
classes. In section 1.4.5, we show how many labels are needed to represent any
given classifiers.
As mentioned in the introduction, in the Machine Learning literature, a neural
network is built from a set of simple classifiers. Given a data set and a set
of labels, a researcher can add many linear classifiers to build a large neural
network that can shatter data points to the correct classes. More generally, a
researcher can combine many different functions to form a complex function
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with lots of parameters to shatter the set of data points to the correct classes.
One of our main goals is to do the same in this abstract setup without any
notion of a norm, distance, or even a topology.
One of the primary results of the next section is to show that how a complex
classifier (whether with lots of classes or with a complex structure of the
underlying lattice) can be decomposed into simpler classifiers3. For example,
how any classifier can be obtained by combining only binary classifiers ,
which is the simplest non-trivial classifier. A binary classifier is a closure
operator with only two different classes (other than the H). One class is
the set of data points that satisfies a single property, and the other class is
all data points. Any binary classifier is obtained by considering a labeling
correspondence with only a single label. One class is the set of all data points
that have the label, and the other class is the set of all data points. In this
sense, a binary classifier can understand if a data point has that single label
or not. In other words, it can understand if a single point is in a specific class
or not. Combining these simple classifier can build any complex classifier.
In the next section, we show a general result on how any classifier can be
decomposed into simpler classifiers (not only into the binary ones). Moreover,
we find all possible decompositions. We also obtain the minimum number of
simple classifiers that can generate a given classifier.
1.4 On Representation of Classifiers
In this section, we show how to decompose a classifier into many simpler
classifiers. Our decomposition is closely related to the generation of standard
convex hull operator using continuous linear functionals. Before going to the
details of our results, let us remind our readers of the basic results of standard
convex geometry and describe the relevant interpretation for our setup.
1.4.1 Linear Classifiers in Simple Euclidean Environment
Let A Ď Rn. We denote by ConvpAq the set of all convex combinations of
vectors in A and clpAq as the closure of A. Let consider the linear functional
f : Rn Ñ R. By the Fre´chet–Riesz theorem any linear functional can be
represented as an inner product with a vector. In other words, for any linear
functional f , there exists a vector vf P Rn such that fp¨q “ x¨, vfy, where x¨, ¨y
3We describe the notion of complexity in the next section. However, one might think of
a lattice with lots of nodes and a large anti-chain as a complex structure.
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represents the inner product in Rn. Hence, we use the term linear functional
f and the corresponding inner product representation x¨, vfy interchangeably.
Let A be a bounded subset of Rn. We define the support function of A
in the direction v P Rn by hApvq “ supyPAxy, vy. The support hyper plane
ty P Rn| xy, vy “ hApvqu is the hyperplane tangent to A with the slope v. We
denote the closed lower half-space that contains A and is tangent to A with
the slope v by Hpv, hAq “ ty P Rn| xy, vy ď hApvqu and we call it the support
half-space .
By using the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (SHT), if A is a closed convex
set and x P RnzA, then there exists a linear functional f : Rn Ñ R that strictly
separates A and x. In other words, there exist a positive number c ą 0 and a
vector v P Rn such that fp¨q “ă ¨, v ą and @y P A fpyq ă c ă fpxq. Hence,
x R Hpv, hAq.
As a result of the previous discussion, if A is a closed convex set, we can write
it in terms of the intersection of supporting half-spaces. More generally, for





There is a nice interpretation of Equation 1.2 related to the purpose of our
paper. Assume that a decision-maker tries to classify different shapes in Rn.
If she has only access to the support functions, then she can distinguish two
shapes that have different convex hulls. However, if two different shapes have
the same convex hull, then from her perspective there is no difference between
them.
In another more intuitive interpretation, a simple linear classifier is a
closed half-space Hpv, aq “ ty P Rn|xy, vy ď au for some v P Rn, a P R. Given
a data point x, a simple linear classifier can detect if the point is inside or
not. More generally, given a set of point A P Rn, it can recognize if the whole
set A is inside or not. A decision-maker that has access to all simple linear
classifiers can detect differences between two shapes with the different convex
hulls. However, any two different shapes with the same convex hull are similar
through the eyes of any simple linear classifiers.
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Notice that based on the above discussion, if a decision-maker wants to detect
two different shapes with the same convex hull, she needs to have access to
more complex classifiers (something that is not built using only linear classifiers
in the above sense). However, before going to the details of our main results
consider the following example.
Example 2. Let consider a decision-maker that tries to classify bounded
shapes in R2. Assume that she has access to simple linear classifiers in the di-
rection of v1 “ p1, 0q, v2 “ p0, 1q. In other words, given any bounded set A P R2
and any closed half-space Hpv, aq “ ty P Rn| xy, vy ď au with v P tv1, v2u and
a P R, she can detect if A is inside Hpv, aq or not. Then from her perspective,
there is no difference between the unit circle at the origin and a rhombus with
congruent diagonals of length two which is centered at the origin. From her
perspective, both are similar to a square with length two which is centered at
the origin.
She can classify previous two shapes into two different classes, if she can access
to another linear classifier in another direction, such as the direction of v3 “
p1, 1q.
However, using only v1, v2 she can still classify many different shapes, as long
as they are different from the perspective of at least one of the linear classifiers
of the form Hpv, aq “ ty P Rn| xy, vy ď au with v P tv1, v2u and a P R. Given
two bounded data sets A,B Ď R2, she first finds the smallest rectangle fA that
contains A, and the smallest rectangle fB that contains B. Then, she compares
fA with fB. If both fA and fB are the same, then from her perspective A and
B are the same. Otherwise, she classifies them as different categories.
Considering the above decision-maker, we define the function f from the set
of bounded subsets of R2 to the set of rectangles in R2, which associates with
any bounded A Ď R2 the smallest rectangle that contains A. It can be shown
that f is a closure operator. The class of each bounded shape A P R2 is just
fpAq. Hence, the decision-maker classifies different shapes according to f .
Now, we consider the reverse problem in example 2. Assume that we observe
that the decision-maker classifies different shapes using f . How can we decom-
pose f to simple linear classifiers built using v1, v2? The more general question
is that if a set of different classes revealed through the observation of the labels
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of a data set, how can we decompose the revealed classifier into its underlying
simpler classifiers?
In the next section, our goal is to answer the previous questions for any general
classifier in our abstract setup of section 1.3.
1.4.2 General Representation of Classifiers
In this section, we assume that X is a finite set of data points. Based on
our discussion of section 1.3, we use the terms closure operator and classifier
interchangeably. Our first proposition is rewriting the duality property of
Equation 1.2 for the class of abstract classifiers (closure operators). To do
that, we define the following notations.
Let Á be a weak order on X and A Ď X. We denote the set of all weak orders
on X by R. The role of R for X is the same as the role of the dual of Rn
(which is the set of all continuous linear functional, which in the case of finite
dimensional vector spaces is the space itself) for Rn. We define the support
function of A, hA : R Ñ 2X , by hApÁq “ tx P A| x Á y @y P Au. Notice
that the definition is similar to the Euclidean case. However, instead of the
supremum of the inner product, we use all maximal elements of the set A with
respect to the direction Á.
Similar to the Euclidean case, we define the support half-space of the set
A ‰ H with respect to the order Á by HpÁ, hAq “ tx P X| hApÁq Á xu. We
define HpÁ, hHq “ H.
Our first proposition is the general version of Equation 1.2 for our abstract
environment. The result characterizes any closure operator as a combination
of weak orders.
Proposition 2. Let f : 2X Ñ 2X be a closure operator (classifier). Then





Moreover, for any given set of week orders Á1, . . . ,Ál on X, the operator
g : 2X Ñ 2X defined by gpAq “ ŞiPt1,...,luHpÁi, hAq is a closure operator.
Proof. First, we prove that if f is a closure operator, then there exists a set of
weak orders tÁ1, . . . ,Áku that generates it as in Equation 1.3. Consider the
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set of closed sets of f , which is SpX, fq. For any C P SpX, fq, we associate a
single weak order ÁC as follows:
• for every x, y P C, let x „C y,
• for every x, y P XzC, let x „C y,
• for every x P C and y P XzC, let x ąC y.
For any given A P 2X and for any given ÁC as as defined above, we have:
HpÁC , hAq “
$’’’&’’’%
H if A “ H,
C if A Ď C,
X otherwise.
(1.4)
We will show that tÁC | C P SpX, fqu generates f , as in Equation 1.3.
Let A Ď 2X and C P SpX, fq. Consider the following cases:
If A Ď C, then closedness of C and monotonicity of f together imply that
fpAq Ď fpCq “ C. Therefore, by Equation 1.4, HpÁC , hAq “ C and fpAq Ď
HpÁC , hAq.
If A Ę C, then HpÁC , hAq “ X. Therefore, fpAq Ď HpÁC , hAq.
As a result of the previous cases fpAq Ď ŞCPSpX,fqHpÁC , hAq. Since f is
a closure operator, we have fpAq P SpX, fq. Let ÁfpAq represents the weak
ordered associated with fpAq. Since A Ď fpAq, by Equation 1.4, HpÁfpAq
, hAq “ fpAq. Thus, ŞCPSpX,fqHpÁC , hAq Ď HpÁfpAq, hAq “ fpAq. Therefore,
fpAq “ ŞCPSpX,fqHpÁC , hAq. The last result completes the first part of the
proposition.
For the other direction, let tÁ1, . . . ,Áku be a set of weak orders. We show
that the operator f , defined as in Equation 1.3, is a closure operator.
We will check all the properties of the closure operator.
By the definition of support half-space, HpÁi, hHq “ H for every i. Hence,
fpHq “ H. Moreover, for every A and every i, we have A Ď HpÁi, hAq.
Therefore, f is extensive.
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Next, we show that f is monotonic. Let A Ď B and ÁiP tÁ1, . . . ,Áku. By the
definition of support function, hBpÁiq Ái hApÁiq. Hence, HpÁi, hAq Ď HpÁi
, hBq. Therefore, f is monotonic.
Finally, we show that f is idempotence. Since we have already shown that f
is monotonic, we only need to show that fpfpAqq Ď fpAq for every A.
Let x P fpfpAqq. By the definition of f , we have x P HpÁi, hfpAqq for every
i P t1, . . . , ku. As a result, we have y Ái x for all y P hfpAqpÁiq.
Let y P hfpAqpÁiq. Notice that y P hfpAqpÁiq implies that y P fpAq “Ş
iPt1,...,luHpÁi, hAq Ď HpÁi, hAq. Therefore, since y Ái x and y P HpÁi, hAq,
then we have x P HpÁi, hAq. Therefore, x Ď ŞiPt1,...,luHpÁi, hAq “ fpAq. The
last result completes the proof.
As a result of the above proposition, we say that the set of weak orders tÁ1
, . . . ,Áku generates the closure operator f , if fpAq “ ŞÁiPt1,...,kuHpÁi, hAq.
There are many useful properties of the closure operators generated by a single
weak order. To exploit them, consider ÁP R. We denote the closure operator
generated by Á by fÁ. We call a closure operator (classifier) that generated
by a single weak order a simple closure operator or a simple classifier .
The first observation is that @A P 2X , fpAq “ HpÁ, hAq. Thus, the set of
closed sets (classes) is SpX, fÁq “ tHpA, hAq| A Ď Xu. Moreover, SpX, fÁq is
a single chain respect to the set inclusion. In other words, the lattice associated
with fÁ is a total order. Given any two classes of fÁ, one of them is the subset
of the other one. The role of simple closure operators in our setup is similar
to the role of continuous linear functionals in the previous section.
Interestingly, the reverse is also correct. If a lattice associated with a classifier
f is a single chain (total order), then it is generated by a single unique weak
order.
Lemma 2. The lattice associated with a closure operator is a single chain
if and only if a single weak order generates it. Moreover, the weak order
generating the lattice is unique.
Proof. If Á generates f , then Proposition 2 guaranties that f is a closure
operator. By the definition of f , the set of closed sets is SpX, fÁq “ tHpÁ
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, hAq| A Ď Xu. Using the definition of support half-space, SpX, fÁq is a single
chain respect to the set inclusion.
For the other side. If f is a closure operator such that SpX, fq is a single
chain, then define a Á b if and only if fpaq Ě fpbq. Since SpX, fq is a total
order, Á is a weak order.
To show that Á generates f , we need to show that for every A P 2X we have
fpAq “ HpÁ, hAq.
Notice that there should be some x P A with fpxq “ fpAq. Otherwise, since
SpX, fÁq is a single chain, there should be a proper subset of fpAq which
contains all the closure of the singleton subsets of A, which is not correct.
Now, consider any y P fpAq. Since fpyq Ď fpxq, then x Á y. Thus, y P HpÁ
, hAq. As a result, fpAq Ď HpÁ, hAq.
For the other side, since fpxq “ fpAq, then x should be a maximal element
in HpÁ, hAq. Hence, for all y P HpÁ, hAq we have fpyq Ď fpxq “ fpAq. As a
result HpÁ, hAq Ď fpAq. The last result completes the proof.
As a result of the previous lemma, there is no difference between the sets of
weak orders, classifiers with a single chain, and support half-spaces generated
by a weak order. All these three different sets are representing the class of
simple classifiers.
Considering lemma 1, we can rewrite Proposition 2 in a different way:
Corollary 1. Let f : 2X Ñ 2X be a closure operator (classifier). Then there






Moreover, for any given set of simple closure operators g1, . . . , gk on X, the
operator g : 2X Ñ 2X defined by gpAq “ ŞiPt1,...,lu gipAq is a closure operator.
Considering Proposition 2 and corollary 1, then the following observations are
immediate:
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Lemma 3. Let ľ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,ľk (or similarly the corresponding simple closure op-
erators g1, . . . , gk) generate the closure operator f and SpX, fq is the closed
sets of f . We have the following:
1. ľ1, . . . ,ľk (or similarly g1, . . . , gk) are not unique to get f .
2. @A P 2X Hpľi, hAq (or gipAq) are all in SpX, fq.
3. If tľi1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,ľilu is a subset of tľ1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,ľku, by defining the closure op-
erator h generated by ľi1 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,ľil we have SpX, hq Ď SpX, fq
4. If Án is a weak order and g is generated by tÁnu Y tľ1, . . . ,ľku, then
g “ f if and only if SpX, fÁnqq Ď SpX, fq.
Proof. We are going to prove a more general version of the result in Proposi-
tion 4.
The above observations are crucial to build the smallest number of weak orders
that can generate a closure operator f .
Before going into details of the minimal representation, we present a more
general representation of the closure operators.
Equation 1.5 gives us a hint to generalize the representations of the closure
operators. Consider a set of closure operators (classifiers) tg1, . . . , gku, where






The next proposition shows that f is a closure operator. As a result, we call
f the classifier generated by the set of classifiers tg1, . . . , gku.
Proposition 3. Consider any set of closure operators (classifiers) tg1, . . . , gku
on X. If f is the operator generated by them, as in Equation 1.6, then f is a
closure operator.
Proof. Extensivity and monotonicity of f come from extensivity and mono-
tonicity of each of g1, . . . , gk. For the idempotence property, we need to show
that fpfpAqq “ fpAq. By monotonicity of f , we only need to show that
fpfpAqq Ď fpAq.
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Let x be in fpfpAqq. By the definition of f , for all i P t1, . . . , ku x P gipfpAqq.
Again by the definition of f , for all i P t1, . . . , ku x P gipŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAqq.
Since
Ş
jPt1,...,ku gjpAq Ď gipAq and gi is monotonic, then gip
Ş
jPt1,...,ku gjpAqq Ď
gipgipAqq. But, since gi is a closure operator, then gipgipAqq “ gipAq. As
a result, gipŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAqq Ď gipAq. Thus, for all i P t1, . . . , ku we have
x P gipAq, which means that x P ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq. Again by the definition of f ,
the last result shows that x P fpAq. Hence, fpfpAqq Ď fpAq, which completes
the proof.
Both Proposition 2 and 3 are about the representation of closure operators.
However, they are silent on how to check if a set of closure operators tg1, . . . , gku
generates a closure operator f or not.
The next proposition is the answer to the previous question. The following
result is the most general representation of the closure operators.
Proposition 4. Let f and g1, . . . , gk be closure operators(not necessarily sim-
ple) on X. The closure operator f is generated by g1, . . . , gk if and only if:
1. SpX, giq Ď SpX, fq for all i P t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , ku,
2. If A P SpX, fq and if x R A, then there exists a closure operator gi P
tg1, . . . , gku such that x R gipAq.
Proof. First, we show that if f is generated by closure operators g1, . . . , gk,
then we have both conditions.
To prove the first condition, observe that by Proposition 3, f is a closure op-
erator. Let gi P tg1, . . . , gku and A P SpX, giq. Since every gj P tg1, . . . , gku is a
closure operator, then gj is monotonic. Hence, for every gj, A Ď gjpAq. More-
over, since A P SpX, giq, then gipAq “ A. As a result, A “ ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq,
which means that A “ fpAq. Thus, A P SpX, fq. Hence, for every i P
t1, . . . , ku we have SpX, giq Ď SpX, fq.
To prove the second condition, let A P SpX, fq and x R A. By the definition of
f , x R A “ fpAq “ ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq. Therefore, there exists some i P t1, . . . , ku
such that x R gipAq. Thus, we complete the proof of the second condition.
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For the other side of the proposition, we assume that both conditions are
satisfied. We show that fpAq “ ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq.
By the first condition, for all i P t1, . . . , ku SpX, giq Ď SpX, fq. Hence, for ev-
ery A P 2X and for every i P t1, . . . , ku we have A Ď gipAq Ď fpAq. Therefore,
A Ď ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq Ď fpAq. Since SpX, fq is closed under intersection and
gipAq Ď SpX, giq Ď SpX, fq, we also have ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq P SpX, fq.
Since f is a closure operator, it is monotonic. Applying f to all terms of
A Ď ŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAq Ď fpAq, gives us fpAq Ď fpŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAqq Ď fpfpAqq.
By idempotence property of f , we have fpAq Ď fpŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAqq Ď fpAq,
which results in fpAq “ fpŞjPt1,...,ku gjpAqq. But we have already shown
that
Ş
jPt1,...,ku gjpAq P SpX, fq. Therefore, fpAq “ fp
Ş
jPt1,...,ku gjpAqq “Ş
jPt1,...,ku gjpAq. Thus, we show that fpAq “
Ş
jPt1,...,ku gjpAq. The last re-
sult completes the proof.
There are some comments regarding the above proposition. Assume that the
classifier f is generated by g1, . . . , gk. By the first condition of the proposition,
the set of classes (or closed sets) of f is finer than any of the classifiers gi.
It means that f can separate data points into more classes than any of gi.
Moreover, there is no class that any of gi can detect and f can not.
The second condition is similar to the Separating Hyper Plane Theorem in
convex geometry. It means that if A is a class of f and x R A, then there
should be a separating classifier gi P tg1, . . . , gku that detect that x is not in
the class of A respect to the classifier gi (which in the eyes of gi, the class of
A is gipAq, which is not necessarily fpAq).
The previous set of propositions let us fully understand different structures be-
hind closure operators (classifiers). As a result, we have the following hierarchy
of classifiers.
1.4.3 Hierarchy of Classifiers
A classifier f : 2X Ñ 2X is more complex than a classifier g : 2X Ñ 2X if
SpX, gq Ď SpX, fq. In other words, in a virtue of Proposition 4, by combining
some other classifiers with g we can generate f .
We have already defined a simple classifier f as a closure operator with a
single chain structure underlying its associated lattice SpX, fq. More generally,
we say that f is a simple classifier with length k, whenever the number
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of closed sets (classes) generated by f , |SpX, fq|, is k` 1. Notice that SpX, fq
always contains H and X. Hence, a simple classifier with length k has k
nonempty different classes.
The trivial classifier is the closure operator with only two closed sets H
and X. The trivial classifier does not classify data points at all. It only
understands that we have a data set X. It might represent a data set with no
label or a data set with all data points having the same labels. As a result,
there are no differences between our data points.
The simplest possible non-trivial classifier is a classifier with length two, which
we call the binary classifier . Any binary classifier can be built using a
labeling correspondence with only one label. The binary classifier can detect
if a data point has a single property or not. In other words, it can detect if a
data point is in a single class associated with a single property or not.
Remark 3. Using the proof of Lemma 2, any simple classifier with length k is
associated with a unique weak order with k different indifference classes. Let
tA1, . . . , Aku be a partition of X into the indifference classes of a weak order
Á with x ą y whenever y P Ai, x P Aj such that i ă j. Then, tA1, pA1 Y
A2q, . . . , pA1Y, A2 Y . . .Y, Akqu is the set of closed sets of a simple classifier
with length k. The reverse can be done in the same way.
Remark 4. Consider a binary classifier f : 2X Ñ 2X . Assume the that the
corresponding set of closed sets is SpX, fq “ tH, A,Xu. Hence, the corre-
sponding weak order Áf is x Á y iff x P A, y P XzA. From the perspective of
the classification there is no difference between f and another binary classifier
g with SpX, gq “ tH, XzA,Xu. The weak order associated with g is the re-
verse order of Áf . From The perspective of labeling correspondence, one can
build the classifier f by attaching a single label l1 to the points in A. The
second one, g, can be built by attaching l2 to XzA, representing not having
l1.
Assume that we can infer a classifier f through a set of data points X. As
discussed in the previous section, we want to find a representation of f using
the simpler classifiers. For example, we may ask a decision-maker about dif-
ferent classes of goods in a supermarket. However, she might classify object
through different labels or different criteria like different brands, sizes, colors,
being closer to the entrance of a supermarket, and many more. Her complex
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classifier can be built based on simple classifiers that combine these single di-
mensional properties. Proposition 4 help us to identify all different possible
representations.
Example 3. Let us revisit Proposition 2. We have already proved that any
given classifier f can be generated by some weak orders Á1, . . . ,Ák. However,
we want to use Proposition 4 to build some binary classifiers tg1, . . . , gku to
generate f . One simple way is to notice that for any binary classifier gi,
SpX, giq should be a subset of SpX, fq. Moreover, for any class H ‰ A P
SpX, fq and x R A, there should be one of gi to separate x and A. Hence, if we
consider all binary classifiers gA for every class A in SpX, fq, both requirements
of Proposition 4 will be satisfied.
In the example above, the representation generated uses many binary classi-
fiers. In fact, we used |SpX, fq| ´ 1 binary classifiers. In the next section, we
show how we can get the minimum number of binary classifiers to generate
a complex classifier. However, we can decrease the number of classifiers, if
instead of using only binary classifiers we use simple classifiers with different
lengths.
One way to do that (although it is not the best way) is to decompose the
lattice SpX, fq into chains. Consider sublattices of SpX, fq, each starting
with H and ends with X with only a single chain structure. If we consider
some of the mentioned sublattices that cover the whole SpX, fq, the associated
simple classifiers can generate f .
Consider the following example.
Example 4. Let X “ ta, b, cu be a set of data points and f :
2X Ñ 2X be a closure operator with the set of closed sets SpX, fq “
tH, tau, tbu, tcu, ta, bu, ta, b, cuu. We consider the following three chains:
SpX, g1q “ tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, b, cuu
SpX, g2q “ tH, tbu, ta, bu, ta, b, cuu
SpX, g3q “ tH, tcu, ta, b, cuu
Notice that, since both conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied, then
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Figure 1.2: The lattice associated with the closure operator f is in the top.
The associated decomposition into g1, g2, g3 is in the bottom.
The above example illustrates one way to find the underlying simple classifiers
that can generate a closure operator. In section 1.4.5, we discuss how many
simple classifiers are needed in the minimal representation. Before that, we
provide some comments on the notion of complexity that we defined.
1.4.4 Some Comments on the Notion of Complexity
In the previous section, in the virtue of Proposition 4, we define the notion
of complexity over the set of classifiers which are defined over a given data
set X. We say that, the classifier f is more complex than a classifier g if
SpX, gq Ď SpX, fq. This notion of complexity induces a reflexive and transitive
order over the set of classifiers defined over X. However, it is not a complete
order. To be able to compare different classifier, there might be different ways
to make it complete. We explain some.
First approach, for every classifier the associated lattice gives us some hints
on how to define the order “more complex classifier”. There are some constants
23
associated with every lattice (or more generally with every partially ordered
set).
• The first one is the number of non-empty closed sets (classes) that f can
detect, which is |SpX, fq| ´ 1. We might think that a classifier that can
detect a larger number of classes is a more complex classifier than the
other one which can detect less. Any classifier over the data set X can
detect at most 2|X| ´ 1 number of nonempty classes.
• The second one is the length of the largest chain, not including the
empty set, in the lattice associated with a classifier, which we call it the
depth of the classifier . The depth of the classifier depends on the
maximum number of subcategories which the classifier can detect. The
largest possible depth of a classifier over the set X is |X|.
• The third one is the length of the largest antichain in the associated
lattice, which we defined as the width of the classifier . Through
Dilworth’s theorem (we will cover it in the next section), this number
depends on the minimum number of chains that can cover the structure
of the lattice. If we think of a single chain as a one-dimensional property,
the width of a classifier is kind of the dimension of a classifier (as a
decomposition into the minimum number of chains)
Depending on applications, one might use one or many of the numbers men-
tioned above to compare two different classifiers. For example, the sum of all
three numbers is one possible choice. Notice that all three respect the notion
of complexity that we defined at first. In other words, if f is more complex
than g, in the sense of SpX, gq Ď SpX, fq, then the number of classes that
f can detects, depth of f , and width of f is more than the corresponding
numbers associated with g.
Second approach is through the lens of Proposition 2. As we have seen, any
simple classifier on X is generated through one weak order over X. Hence,
one notion of complexity might be defined as the minimum number of weak
order (MNWO) that can generate a classifier. As we see in the next section,
the minimum number of weak order that can generate a classifier is bounded
by the width of the classifier, but not necessarily the same. This notion of
complexity also respects our first notion of complexity. Again, if f is more
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complex than g, in the sense of SpX, gq Ď SpX, fq, then the minimum number
of weak order needed to generate f is more than the minimum number of weak
order to generate g.
The last approach is through the lens of Example 3. Any classifier can
be generated with a finite number of binary classifiers, which are the simplest
possible non-trivial classifiers. As a result, another notion of complexity might
be defined as the minimum number of binary classifiers (MNBC) that can
generate a classifier. Again, this notion of complexity also respects our first
notion.
Remark 5. The last notion of complexity, through the decomposition into
binary classifiers, is a trade-off between all other notions of complexity. For
any given classifier f , it depends on the number of the classes of f , depth of
f , width of f , and even the minimum number of simple classifiers that can
generate f .
For example, it is not hard to show that any simple classifier with length k
has depth k, width one, and the minimum number of binary classifiers needed
to generate it is k ´ 1. In the other direction, for any classifier with width k
and depth two , the minimum number of binary classifiers needed to generate
it is k.
Let us present some examples.
Example 5. Let X “ ta, b, c, du be the set of data points. Consider the
classifiers f1, f2 defined as follows:
SpX, f1q “ tH, tau, tbu, ta, b, c, duu
SpX, f2q “ tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, b, c, duu
Figure 1.3, illustrates the underlying lattice structures. The classifier f1 has
depth two and width two. The number of nonempty classes that it can detect
is three. The minimum number of simple classifiers that can generate it is two.
Finally, the minimum number of binary classifiers that can generate it is two.
The classifier f2 has depth three and width one. The number of non-empty
classes is three. The minimum number of simple classifiers that can generate
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Figure 1.3: The lattices associated with the closure operator f1 (the left one)
and f2.
it is one. The minimum number of binary classifiers that can generate it is
two.
All numbers are easily seen through the lattices associated with f1, f2. We
can observe that both have the same number of classes and the same MNBC
(minimum number of binary classifiers that can generate it). Moreover, the
sum of their width and depth is also the same.
However, in some cases, the numbers are not as easy to compute as f1, f2.
Notably, in case of the minimum number of binary classifiers that are needed
to decompose a classifier. The following classifiers have interesting associated
values.
Consider the following classifiers f3 and f4:
SpX, f3q “ tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, cu, ta, b, c, duu
SpX, f4q “ tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, b, cu, ta, b, c, duu
Figure 1.4, illustrates the associated lattices. The width, depth, and the num-
ber of classes can easily be seen. The classifier f3 has depth three, width two,
and four nonempty classes. Similarly, the classifier f4 has depth four, width
one, and four nonempty classes.
Both have the same number of classes. Moreover, both have the same sum of
width and depth. Two simple classifiers can generate the classifier f3, and the
classifier f1 can be generated by one simple classifier.
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Figure 1.4: The lattices associated with the closure operator f3 (the left one)
and f4.
However, when it comes to the decomposition into the binary classifiers, we
need to be more careful.
The classifier f4 can be generated with three binary classifiers. It is not hard
to see that the following classifiers are the only minimal representations of f4
through binary classifiers:
SpX, f4,1q “ tH, tau, ta, b, c, duu
SpX, f4,2q “ tH, ta, bu, ta, b, c, duu
SpX, f4,3q “ tH, ta, b, cu, ta, b, c, duu
Proposition 4 is the reason why we need all three.
Now consider the classifier f3. At first sight, we might think we need at least
three binary classifiers to generate it. However, surprisingly, in this case, we
only need two binary classifiers. We define the classifiers f3,1, f3,2 as follows:
SpX, f3,1q “ tH, ta, bu, ta, b, c, duu
SpX, f3,2q “ tH, ta, cu, ta, b, c, duu
By the second condition in Proposition 4, since tau “ ta, bu X ta, cu, we can
see that f3,1, f3,2 generate f3.
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Hence, if we think about MNBC as a notion of complexity, then interestingly
f4 is more complex than f3.
In the next section, we discuss in more detail how many simple classifiers and
binary classifiers are needed to generate a given classifier.
1.4.5 How Many Simple classifiers are Needed to Generate a Clas-
sifier?
Consider example 4 and the discussion right before that about how to de-
compose a classifier into simple classifiers that generate it. In this form of
decomposition, the minimum number of the simple classifiers needed to gener-
ate a closure operator f can be bounded using the minimum number of chains
that can cover the underlying lattice SpX, fq.
However, it is well known how many chains are needed to decompose a partially
ordered set into chains that cover it. By using the Dilworth’s Theorem ,
any finite partially ordered set has a maximal antichain with the same size as
the smallest chain decomposition. As a result of the mentioned theorem, the
width of a partially ordered set defined as the length of its largest antichain
or the size of the smallest chain decomposition.
As a result of the Dilworth’s Theorem, given any closure operator f , we can
decompose the underlying lattice to a chain covering with the size of the width
of the underlying lattice structure. Then, adding the H as the smallest ele-
ment and X as the largest element to each of the chain in the smallest chain
decomposition makes each chain a simple classifier. Therefore, the minimum
number of simple classifiers needed to generate a classifier is bounded by the
width of the underlying lattice structure. Hence, we have our first bound as
follows.
Lemma 4. Let f be a classifier over the set of data points X. The minimum
number of simple classifiers needed to generate it is bounded by the width of
the lattice SpX, fq.
However, the minimum number of simple classifiers that can generate a given
classifier f is not necessarily the width of the underlying lattice structure.
Consider the following example.
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ta, b, cu
ta, bu tb, cu
tau tbu tcu
H
Figure 1.5: The lattice associated with the classifier f .
Example 6. Let X “ ta, b, cu be a set of data points. We define the classifier
f as follows:
SpX, fq “ tH, tau, tbu, tcu, ta, bu, tb, cu, ta, b, cuu
Figure 1.5 illustrates the lattice associated with f . The antichain with classes
tau, tbu, tcu is the largest antichain in the lattice. Therefore, the width of
the lattice SpX, fq is three. As a result of the Dilworth’s Theorem, one can
decompose the lattice to three chains. For example, the three chains C1 “
tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, b, cuu, C2 “ ttcu, tb, cuu, and C3 “ ttbuu. Attaching H and
ta, b, cu to each of the three chains implies the following three simple classifiers:
SpX, fC1q “ tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, b, cuu
SpX, fC2q “ tH, tcu, tb, cu, ta, b, cuu
SpX, fC3q “ tH, tbu, ta, b, cuu
However, we can generate f by only two simple classifiers. Let the classifiers
f1, f2 be as follow:
SpX, f1q “ tH, tau, ta, bu, ta, b, cuu
SpX, f2q “ tH, tcu, tb, cu, ta, b, cuu
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By using the second condition of Proposition 4, since tbu “ ta, bu X tb, cu
then f1, f2 can generate f . Therefore, the minimum number of weak order
(MNWO) generating f is only two, which is less than its width which is three.
The above example shows that for some classifiers their MNWO is less than
their widths. The reason lies behind the observation that, if any class is
the same as the intersection of some other classes detected by some simple
classifiers, then the class will be detected without adding it to any simple
classifier. Formally, consider the following discussion.
Let f be a classifier and the set of classifiers tg1, . . . , gku generates it. Using
our Proposition 4, every class of f which is not the intersection of some other
different classes of g1, . . . , gk should appear in at least one of the classifiers
g1, . . . , gk. However, any other class does not necessarily need to be a class in
one of g1, . . . , gk. As a result, we have the following procedure.
We remove all the classes that are the intersections of some other classes from
the lattice SpX, fq. In other words, every class that has an out-degree of
more than two, in the lattice SpX, fq, will be removed. The remaining set is
a partially ordered set, with respect to the set inclusion. By the Dilworth’s
Theorem, the MNWO should be the width of the remaining partially ordered
set. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let f be a classifier defined over the data set X. Let SpX, fq
denote the set of classes. The partial ordered P pX, fq generated by removing
the classes in SpX, fq which are the intersections of some other classes. The
minimum number of weak orders needed to generate f is equal to the width of
P pX, fq.
Example 7. Consider Example 6. If we use the procedure introduced in
Proposition 5, then the partially ordered set P pX, fq will be obtained be re-
moving the classesH and tbu from SpX, fq. Figure 1.6 illustrates the structure
of P pX, fq. The width of P pX, fq is two, which is the same as the MNWO of
f .
The same observation and technique work to find the minimum number of
binary classifiers needed to generate a given closure operator. The following
proposition explains the result.
30
ta, b, cu
ta, bu tb, cu
tau tcu
Figure 1.6: The lattice associated with P pX, fq.
Proposition 6. Let f be a classifier defined over the data set X. Let SpX, fq
denote the set of classes. The partial ordered BpX, fq generated by removing
the classes in SpX, fq which are the intersections of some other classes and
also removing the classes H and X. The minimum number of weak orders with
two indifference classes that are needed to generate f is equal to |BpX, fq|.
In the above proposition, since both H and X are generated through any
binary classifier, we can remove them from SpX, fq. Every other class in the
remaining partially ordered set BpX, fq should be contained in one of the
binary classifiers.
Example 8. Consider Example 5. By using Proposition 6, the partially or-
dered set BpX, fq is equal to tta, bu, tb, cuu. The cardinality of BpX, fq is two,
which is the same as MNBC of the classifier f .
In the next section, we discuss some applications of our results in the context of
preference ordering over menus. Moreover, we show an additive representation
of our results in the same context.
1.5 Preference Ordering Over Menus
1.5.1 Overview
Kreps (1979) introduced the concept of preference ordering over menus to
study the dynamic choice behavior of a decision-maker. Up to Kreps’ work, in
most standard models of decision making, a decision-maker has a preference
ordering (weak order), Á, over a set of alternatives X. As a result, her prefer-
ence ordering induces another preference ordering, Á1, over the set of menus,
2X , as follows:
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A Á1 B iff @b P B, Da P A such that a Á b. (1.7)
As Kreps mentioned, the preference ordering Á1 satisfies the following prop-
erty:
A Á1 B implies A „1 AYB for every menus A and B. (1.8)
In other words, the decision-maker does not care to have an option to have a
larger menu AYB instead of the smaller menu A.
However, in many applications, a decision-maker might have the desire to
have the flexibility of choices . For example, consider a decision-maker
that has an option first to decide which menu she wants to select for tomorrow’s
lunch. Then in the next day, she can decide which meal she wants to eat from
the selected menu. In this scenario, the decision-maker might like to have the
option of the larger menu, since she is not sure about her tomorrow’s mood or
taste.
As a result, Kreps relaxed the assumption in Equation 1.8. He replaced it by
the following two axioms.
1. Desire for flexibility: B Ď A implies A Á1 B,
2. Ordinal submodularity: A „1 A Y B implies that for all C, A Y C „1
AYB Y C.
Kreps’ main result is as follows:
Theorem 1. (Kreps, 1979)
Let X is a finite set of alternatives. A binary relation Á1 is a weak order
satisfies the desire for flexibility and ordinal submodularity if and only if there





aPA Upa, sqs (1.9)
represents Á1.
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The representation captures the idea that the decision-maker has a subjective
state space S, and in each state s P S, she has a preference ordering represented
by Up., sq over the set of alternatives. Therefore, whenever she compares two
menus, she compares the expected values of the menus with respect to her
state-dependant utility.
Kreps also has another result to prove his main theorem, which is an interesting
result by itself.
Theorem 2. (Kreps, 1979)
Let X is a finite set of alternatives. A binary relation Á1 is a weak order
satisfies the desire for flexibility and ordinal submodularity if and only if there
exist a finite set S, a function U : X ˆ S Ñ R, and a strictly increasing
function u : RS Ñ R such that
uprmax
aPA Upa, sqssPSq (1.10)
represents Á1.
Following Kreps (1979), the seminal papers by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(2001)(DLR) and Gul et al. (2001) extend the domain of the set of alternatives
to the set of simple lotteries, ∆pXq. In their models, the preference ordering
is over the set of menus of lotteries. Their setup not only considers the desire
for flexibility, but also the desire for commitment . Consider the following
example as a motivation behind the desire for commitment.
Again, consider a decision-maker that wants to select a menu for tomorrow’s
lunch. Assume she knows that if there is a heavy meal in a menu, she will be
tempted to select it. As a result, she might select a smaller menu to control
herself from her future temptation in the following day.
The paper by DLR is demanding more than Kreps’ axioms. As oppose to
Kreps, their representation also heavily depends on tools from convex and
functional analysis. One of their core axioms is the indifference to ran-
domization (IR): for every menu A Ď ∆pXq, A „1 ConvpAq.
By assuming (IR), any given menu has the same ordering as its convex hull.
One of their main results is as follows:
Theorem 3. (Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini, 2001) A binary relation Á1 is a
weak order, continuous, non-trivial, and satisfies (IR) if and only if there exist
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a set S and a utility function U : ∆pXq ˆ S Ñ R and a function u : RS Ñ R
such that
uprmax
aPA Upa, sqssPSq (1.11)
represents Á1, continuous, each Up, sq is an expected-utility, and two other
conditions which are not crucial for our setup.
In the representation above, they show that adding the Kreps’ desire for flex-
ibility axiom makes the aggregator function u strictly increasing.
In other words, in their setup, they replaced the submodularity and desire for
flexibility with continuity, non-triviality, IR, and monotonicity (kreps’ desire
for flexibility) to get a similar representation.
They also show that by strengthening IR to independence axiom, then the
aggregator, u, attains an additive form. In other words, there exists a finitely








Upa, sq µpdsq. (1.12)
In the above representation, adding the monotonicity axiom (Kreps’ desire for
flexibility) makes µ to be a positive measure, which makes the representation
similar to the kreps’ representation in Equation 1.9.
However, in the more general representation of Equation 1.12, one can asso-
ciate the set of states which are positive, respects to the measure µ, to the
desire for flexibility. Similarly, the negative states are the ones associated with
the desire for commitment. Finally, as mentioned by DLR, the size of the
minimal state space can be a measure of the decision-maker’s un-
certainty about her future’s taste . Unlike the Kreps’ model, they can
construct the minimal state space uniquely.
One of our goals is to explain the finite setting of Kreps through a concept
similar to the DLR’s IR. In the next section, we show that our notion of a
preference ordering respecting a classifier gives us some interesting
results, even more general than both DLR and Kreps (in finite setting). More-
over, we have a bound on how many states needed to rationalize a preference
ordering over the set of menus. Finally, we prove an additive representation
similar to the DLR’s version for a finite setting of Kreps. We should mention
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that, as a corollary of our results, any preference ordering over the set of menus
can be rationalized through the additive representation.
1.5.2 A Preference Ordering Respecting a Classifier
In this section, let X be a finite set of alternatives. The preference ordering
Á1 is a weak order over the set of menus of X. We assume that a classifier
f : 2X Ñ 2X is revealed through some observations. Moreover, we assume
that the preference ordering Á1 respects f in the following sense.
Definition 3. Let f : 2X Ñ 2X be a classifier and Á1 be a transitive preference
ordering over the set of menus of X. We say that the preference ordering
Á1 respects the classifier f , if for every menu A P 2X , we have A „1 fpAq.
The idea is that we learn some parts of the indifference classes of a prefer-
ence ordering through some observations. The part we have learned can be
represented by the classifier f .
Notice that every preference ordering always respects the identity classifier,
which is defined as IpAq “ A for every A P 2X . In other words, if there is no
information available, we can only learn the identity classifier. In this case,
certainly every preference ordering respects the identity classifier.
Remark 6. In the DLR’s setting they put the IR axiom as their core axiom.
The closure operator is a generalization of the convex hull operator in our
abstract setup. However, we do not put it as an axiom. We assume that
there is always one choice of the classifier which is revealed through some
observations. If there is no such revelation, we consider the identity classifier
as a choice which every preference ordering respects it. Hence, our results are
as general as possible.
There are two applications of our definition in this paper. In the next section,
we show how to find an additive representation of a preference ordering that
has a revealed classifier f , with at most 2p|SpX, fq| ´ 1q number of subjective
states.
In the rest of this section, we show the other application of our definition.
Consider the two main axioms in the Kreps’ setting. Assume that a preference
ordering Á1 satisfies both the desire for flexibility and ordinal submodularity.






It follows easily from the definitions of the two axioms, or lemma 1 in Kreps
(1979), that:
1. f is a closure operator,
2. Á1 respects f ,
3. A „1 AYB if and only if fpBq Ď fpAq,
4. fpBq Ă fpAq, then A ą1 B.
The whole idea is that, if A „1 AYB, then by the desire for flexibility axiom
it will be revealed that A Á1 B.
Now, consider our results in section 1.4.2 and consider the following procedure.
Let the set of simple classifiers G “ tg1, . . . , gku generates f . Let the set tÁ1
, . . . ,Áku be the corresponding weak orders associated with the set G. Finally,
let a function Ui : X Ñ R be a representation of Ái for every i P t1, . . . , ku.
Then, using our representations, it is not difficult to see that fpBq Ă fpAq if
and only if each coordinates of the vector pmaxbPBUipbqqiPt1,...,ku is less than or
equal to pmaxaPAUipaqqiPt1,...,ku and the two vectors are not the same.
As a result, we can define the strictly increasing function u : Rk Ñ R such
that uppmaxaPAUipaqqiPt1,...,kuq represents Á1.
It is not hard to see that every representation as in Equation 1.10 can be
derived using the procedure mentioned above. Using our Proposition 5, the
minimum number of states needed to represent Á1 is precisely the width of
P pX, fq, which is the MNWO of f .
We summarize the above discussions in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Let a binary relation Á1 be a weak order and satisfies both the
desire for flexibility and ordinal submodularity, then Á1 can be represented as
in Equation 1.10. Moreover, any representation in this form can be generated
using the procedure defined above. Finally, the minimum number of states
(cardinality of S) needed for the representation is precisely the MNWO of the
associated classifiers f defined as in Equation 1.13, which is |P pX, fq|.
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1.5.3 Additive Representation
In this section, we wrap up our discussion by presenting our last result on the
additive representation of a preference ordering that has a revealed classifier
f .
Let X be a set of alternatives. The classifier f has been revealed. For ev-
ery transitive preference ordering Á1 that respects f we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 8. If the classifier f has been revealed, then for every transitive
preference ordering Á1 that respects f , there exist a state space S, where S “
S` Y S´ with S` X S´ “ H and the cardinality of at most 2p|SpX, fq| ´ 1q,









aPA Upa, sq (1.14)
represents Á1.
Proof. We use the Mo¨bius inversion formula to prove the result. Appendix A.1
explains the technique in more detail.
Consider the lattice SpX, fq. Define the partial order Á over SpX, fq by
reversing the partial order induced by the set inclusion. In other words, A Á B
if and only if A Ď B. We can check that the meet and join of the lattice SpX, fq
will be swapped.
Since Á1 is a transitive binary relation, we can make it a weak order over the
finite set 2X . Then there should be a representation by real-valued functions.
Consider any utility function U : 2X Ñ R that represents Á1.






Mo¨bius inversion formula guarantees that the Mo¨bius operator is bijective
and the inverse is Φ´1pgqpAq “ řAÁB µpB,AqgpBq, where µ is the Mo¨bius
function.
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Notice that the above equation is only correct for A P SpX, fq. However,
since Á1 respects f and U represents Á1, then for every A P 2X we have
UpAq “ UpfpAqq. Therefore, for every A P 2X , since fpAq P SpX, fq, we have





Note that, since f is a closure operator, then A Ď B if and only if fpAq Ď B






We define h`pBq “ maxp0, hpBqq and h´pBq “ maxp0,´hpBqq. Since h “










By comparing the above equation and Equation 1.14, we only need to make
some changes to make them equal. The trick is as follows.
We define functions U`, U´ : pX ˆ SpX, fqzHq Ñ R as follows:
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U`px,Bq “
$&%´h`pBq if x P B0 if x R B
U´px,Bq “
$&%´h´pBq if x P B0 if x R B









$&%´h´pBq if A Ď B0 otherwise
























































Equation 1.22 and 1.14 are similar except their indexes. To make them
the same, we consider any two disjoint sets S`, S´ Ď N 4, with both have
|SpX, fq|´1 elements. We consider any two bijection index1 : S` Ñ SpX, fqzH, index2 :
S´ Ñ SpX, fqzH. Let S “ S` Y S´. We define the function U : X ˆ S Ñ R
as follows:
4The choice of N is arbitrary. As long as S`, S´ are disjoint and each has |SpX, fq| ´ 1
elements, our argument follows.
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Upx, sq “
$&%U´px, index1psqq if s P S`U`px, index2psqq if s P S´





















aPA Upa, sq (1.23)
Equation 1.23 finishes our proof.
Our previous proposition works for any choice of classifiers that respect the
preference ordering Á1. However, the identity operator respects any given
preference ordering and |SpX, Iq| “ 2|X|. Therefore, as a corollary to the
above proposition, we have the following result.
Corollary 2. For every preference ordering Á1 over the set of menus, there
exists a representation as in Equation 1.14 with at most 2ˆ p2|X| ´ 1q states.
Remark 7. Notice that the above representation is not a minimal additive
representation. For example, let a one-to-one utility function U : X Ñ R
induces a preference ordering Á1 over the set of menus. It is not hard to
see that the minimal classifier f that respects Á1 has at least |X| nonempty
classes. Thus, our construction in Proposition 8 generates a representation
with at least 2p|X| ´ 1q subjective states. However the original construction
only needs one state, which can be represented by U itself 5.
1.6 Literature Review
The basic concepts of abstract convex geometry and combinatorial convex hull
operator are developed in Edelman et al. (1985). In decision theory, Koshevoy
(1999) studies the connection between the combinatorial convex hull operators
and the path independent choice functions. The closest paper is by Richter
5We are working on another paper which might provide an answer on how to build the
minimal additive representation.
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et al. (2018). They provide a characterization of a combinatorial convex hull
operator through a set of primitive orderings. Using their representation, they
propose a notion of competitive equilibrium in an abstract environment.
In the context of dynamic choice behaviors, following Kreps (1979), Dekel, Lip-
man, and Rustichini (2001)(DLR), and Gul et al. (2001) many papers study
different aspects of choice behaviors. However, the main related papers are
by Kopylov (2009), Kopylov (2018), and Gorno (2016). Kopylov (2009) de-
termines the number of positive and negative states in DLR’s setting. Gorno
(2016) shows that any preference ordering in Kreps’ setting has a represen-
tation as a DLR’s representation. Finally, Kopylov (2018) proposes a combi-
natorial model of subjective states. By relaxing axioms of Kreps’ setting, he
presents a weaker model of coherent aggregation.
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C h a p t e r 2




This paper presents a general model for studying aggregation in different eco-
nomic applications. The outcome of our model depends on aggregation of a
group of features. We focus on a recursive form of aggregation, where the ag-
gregate outcome for larger collections of features results from aggregating the
outcomes of smaller subsets. Specifically, the aggregate outcome of the union
of two disjoint collections of features is a weighted average of the outcome
of each collection of features separately. We show that this form of recursive
aggregation is a common structure that lies behind many seemingly unrelated
results in economic theory.
In our model, there exist a set of features and a set of conditional outcomes.
We associate each conditional outcome with a subset of features, representing
the outcome of the model conditional on aggregation of that subset of features.
Our central axiom, the weighted averaging axiom, is a simple formalization of
the recursivity. It imposes a structure on how the outcome of the union of
two disjoint subsets of features relates to the outcome of each of the subsets
separately. The axiom states that the outcome of a set of features can be
recursively computed by first partitioning the set of features into two disjoint
subsets. Then, the aggregated outcome is a weighted average of the outcome
of each of the two smaller subsets.
This paper makes two contributions. The first contribution is to find all ag-
gregation procedures that satisfy weighted averaging. The result unifies ag-
gregation procedures across many different economic environments, showing
that all of them rely on the same basic result. The second contribution is to
show extensions of the result in different domains of economics. Notably, we
show applications and extensions in the context of Belief Formation, Choice
Theory, and Welfare Economics.
In this paper, we model the dependency of the outcome on the set of aggregated
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features through what we call an aggregation rule. Formally, we define an
aggregation rule as a function on the set of subsets of features that maps each
subset of features to an outcome of the model.
Our main result finds all aggregation rules that satisfy recursivity in the form
of our weighted average axiom. We show that for any two disjoint subsets
of features as long as the outcome of their union is a weighted average (with
non-negative weights) of the outcome of each subset, then the aggregation rule
has a simple form (with a technical richness condition):
There exist a strictly positive weight function and a weak order (a transitive
and complete order) over the set of features, with the outcome of any subset
of features being the weighted average of the outcomes of each of the highest-
ordered features of the subset separately.
The importance of the result is that the weight of each feature is independent of
the group of features which the model tries to aggregate. The role of the weak
order in the main representation is to partition the set of features to different
equivalence classes and rank them from the highest class to the lowest class.
If all features of a subset of features are in the same class, then the outcome
is the weighted average of the outcomes of each member of the set. However,
if some features have a higher ranking than others, then the aggregation rule
will ignore lower-ordered features.
Following the main result, we elaborate on two special cases of our main result.
In the first case, we propose the strict weighted averaging axiom to represent
the case where the outcome of the union of two disjoint subsets of features is
inside the “relative” interior of the outcomes of each subset separately. The
strict weighted averaging axiom captures the idea that the model cannot ignore
the role of one of the subsets in finding the outcome of their union.
We show that the strict weighted averaging axiom is the necessary and suf-
ficient condition that the weak order, in the main representation, has only
one equivalence class. Hence, the outcome of a subset of features is just the
weighted average (with strictly positive weights) of the outcomes of each fea-
ture separately.
In the second case, we look into applications where there is a similarity be-
tween some features. Specifically, we model the space of features as a subset
of a vector space. By considering the distance between vectors, we capture the
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notion of similarity or closeness of features. In this context, an appealing prop-
erty is that by replacing a feature in a subset of features with another closely
similar feature, the outcome of this new subset stays close to the outcome
of the previous one. Under this property, which we define as the continuity
axiom, all similar enough features attain the same ranking with respects to
the weak order. Moreover, the weight function is a continuous function over
the set of features. In other words, the weight between two close (or similar)
features should be close. In a special case, where the space of features is a
convex set, we show that all features attain the same ranking. In this case,
there is no difference between the weighted averaging and the strict weighted
averaging axiom.
Depending on the application, each feature and the aggregation rule may have
different interpretations. Each feature may represent a signal or an event
containing some information about the true state of nature. In this case, the
role of an aggregation rule is to form a belief about the true state of nature.
In the context of choice theory, features may represent choice objects, where
an aggregation rule behaves as a decision maker that selects a lottery or a
random choice out of a group of choice objects. Another interpretation is in the
context of welfare economics, where each feature represents a preference of an
individual over some alternatives. In this case, an aggregation rule represents
a social welfare function that associates with each preference profile, a single
preference ordering over the set of alternatives.
The most immediate interpretation of the result is in the case of modeling an
agent who makes a prediction about the true state of nature, conditional on
observing a set of events. In this context, each feature represents an event,
and the outcome of the model conditional on observing a set of events is the
belief about the true states of nature. The main result is the necessary and
sufficient condition that the belief formation process behaves as a Bayesian
Updater. Under the main axiom, there exists a conditional probability system
associated with the set of events, and the belief formation process conditional
on observing a set of events behaves as a conditional probability. The weak
order of the main result is capturing the idea that, conditional on observing
even a zero probability event, the belief formation still behaves as a Bayesian
updater.
To motivate the framework and results, sections 2.5, 2.6, 3.2, and 4.2 show
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applications and extensions of our main representations. We show that the
weighted averaging axiom is closely related to many known axioms in different
topics, from the Pareto axiom in Social Choice Theory to the path indepen-
dence axiom in Choice Theory.
2.1.2 Applications
2.1.2.1 Belief Formation
In Section 2.5, we interpret the set of features as signals. Each signal contains
some information about the distribution of states of nature. The role of an
aggregation rule is an agent who makes a prediction about the true state
of nature, based on observing some signals. In this context, the range of
an aggregation rule is the probability distributions over the states of nature.
Following Billot, Gilboa, Samet, and Schmeidler (2005), an aggregation rule
is a belief formation process that associates with each finite set of signals, a
belief over the states of nature.
The representation of the belief formation process under the weighted aver-
aging axiom is a straightforward application of the main results. Using our
representation, on the one hand, we propose an extension, where the timing
of signals may be important. We consider the case where an agent can receive
signals in different time zones in the past. The agent tries to form a predic-
tion at the present time, and it may perceive signals closer to the time of the
prediction as more credible. To capture the representation, we introduce the
stationarity axiom, in which a belief induced by a set of received signals and
their timing is the same as the belief induced by shifting the timings of all
signals by a constant number to the past.
Under stationarity, any belief formation process satisfying the strict weighted
averaging axiom has a weight function over the set of signals and an exponen-
tial discount factor over each time zone. The belief associated with a set of re-
ceived signals is the discounted weighted average of the beliefs associated with
each signal. In this case, the weight function captures the time-independent
value of each signal.
On the other hand, we interpret the set of signals as the information structure
of an agent who wants to predict the true state. We interpret each subset of
signals as an event in her information structure. We show that as long as the
information structure has a finite cardinality, the strict weighted averaging ax-
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iom is the necessary and sufficient condition for a rich belief formation process
to appear as a Bayesian updater. This result answers the question in Shmaya
and Yariv (2007) regarding finding a necessary and sufficient condition for a
belief formation process to act as a Bayesian updating rule.
2.1.2.2 Average Choice Functions
In Section 2.6, the set of features is a subset of Rn. We interpret each feature as
a choice object. The interpretation of the aggregation rule is a decision maker
that selects a choice randomly from a menu of choice objects. We model the
decision maker as an average choice function that associates with any menu
of choice objects, an average choice (mean of the distribution of choices) in
the convex combination of choice objects. Average choice is easier to report
and obtain rather than the entire distribution1. However, except for the case
where elements of a menu are affinely independent, average choice does not
uniquely reveal the underlying distribution of choices.
First, using our main representation, we show that it is possible to uniquely
extract the underlying distribution of choices as long as the average choice
function satisfies the weighted averaging axiom.
Then, we illustrate two applications of the result. In one application, we con-
sider the class of average choice functions that can be rationalized by a Luce
rule, i.e., a stochastic choice function that satisfies the independence of irrel-
evant alternatives axiom (IIA) proposed by Luce (1959). We show that the
average choice functions satisfying the strict weighted averaging axiom are ex-
actly the ones that can be rationalized by a Luce rule. More generally, we
show that the class of average choice functions satisfying the weighted aver-
aging axiom is the same as the class of average choice functions rationalizable
by a two-stage Luce model proposed by Echenique and Saito (2018).
In the second application, we consider continuous average choice functions.
First, we show that any continuous average choice function under the weighted
averaging axiom is rationalizable by a Luce rule. This means that there is no
continuous average choice function that is rationalizable by a two-stage Luce
rule but not with a Luce rule.
1Check Ahn, Echenique, and Saito (2018) for the complete discussion on merits of
average choice.
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Then, we illustrate a connection of our result with the one by Kalai and
Megiddo (1980), regarding the impossibility of an average choice function to
satisfy both the path independence axiom and continuity.
2.2 Primitives and Axioms
Let X be a nonempty set of features. Observe that we make no assumptions
about the cardinality or topology of X. We denote the set of all real numbers
by R, and the set of all positive real numbers by R``. We represent n dimen-
sional real vectors by Rn. For any A Ď Rn, we denote by ConvpAq the set of
all convex combinations of vectors in A. Respectively, we denote the relative
interior and boundary of ConvpAq by Conv˝pAq and BrpConvpAqq.
Definition 4. A set A Ď X is a coalition of features of X if it is a nonempty
finite subset of X. We denote the set of all coalitions of X by X˚.
Definition 5. A nonempty set A Ď X is a sub-coalition of a set B Ď X if
A Ď B.
Definition 6. A binary relation ě on X is a weak order on X, if it is
reflexive, transitive, and complete.
We denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of a weak order ě by „
and ą. Given a weak order ě on X for any nonempty coalition A P X˚, we
define the set M pA,ěq as:
MpA,ěq :“ tx P A|x ě y @y P Au (2.1)
The weak orderě captures a member ranking of the set X. Given any coalition
A, MpA,ěq contains the highest-ranked features of A. Since A has a finite
number of features, MpA,ěq is a nonempty subset of A.
Definition 7. An aggregation rule on X is a function f : X˚ Ñ Rn, that
associates with every coalition A P X˚ a vector fpAq P Rn.2
An aggregation rule captures how outcomes depend on each coalition of fea-
tures. In this paper, we focus on recursive aggregation rules. The idea is as
follows: the value of the aggregation rule over a coalition of features depends
2All discussions of this paper continue to hold if Rn is replaced by any general (possibly
infinite dimensional) normed vector space.
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on the aggregated values of any two disjoint sub-coalitions. Specifically, the
aggregated outcome is a weighted average (with non-negative weights) of the
value returned by the aggregation rule for each of the two sub-coalitions.
The idea of recursive aggregation is embodied in the following axiom, which
is central to our analysis:
Axiom 1. (Weighted averaging) If A,B P X˚ and AXB “ H, then
fpAYBq P ConvpfpAq, fpBqq
or equivalently:
D λ P r0, 1s s.t. fpAYBq “ λfpAq ` p1´ λqfpBq.
In the axiom, there is no restriction on how the weights are connected to
each sub-coalition. The weight λ may depend on A,B, and AY B. However,
the main result implies that there is a simple connection between the weights
(which are, furthermore, unique). But first, we will go over some special cases
of the weighted averaging axiom.
The weight λ in the axiom can be any number between zero and one. There
are two special cases: strict and extreme. In the case of the strict version, λ
cannot be zero or one. Therefore, the value of an aggregation rule over any
two disjoint coalitions must be strictly between the values of each separate
coalition. In the extreme case, λ is either zero or one. In this case, the value
of an aggregation rule of the union of two disjoint coalitions becomes equal to
the value over one of the coalitions.
To capture the difference between the two special cases, we introduce the
following axioms:
Axiom 2. (Strict weighted averaging) If A,B P X˚ and A X B “ H,
then
fpAYBq P Conv˝pfpAq, fpBqq
or equivalently:
D λ P p0, 1q s.t. fpAYBq “ λfpAq ` p1´ λqfpBq.
Axiom 3. (Extreme case) If A,B P X˚ and AXB “ H, then
fpAYBq P tfpAq, fpBqu
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or equivalently:
D λ P t0, 1u s.t. fpAYBq “ λfpAq ` p1´ λqfpBq.
We provide two examples of rules satisfying the weighted averaging axiom.
Our examples clarify the strict and extreme cases. The first example is the
standard notion of rational choice, and illustrates the extreme version of the
axiom.
Example 9. Consider a complete strict order ą on the set of features X.
Given any feature x P X, let fpxq P Rn be the outcome of the model based on
observing the single feature x. Given any coalition A P X˚, there is a single
highest-ordered element MpA,ąq in the coalition. We define an aggregation
rule f : X˚ Ñ X over any coalition A P X˚ to be the outcome of the highest-
ordered elements of the coalition A. Formally, we have:
fpAq “ fpMpA,ąqq.
There are two observations. First, the aggregation rule satisfies the weighted
averaging. Second, it is an example of the extreme case. Due to the complete-
ness of the order ą, for any two disjoint coalitions A,B P X˚, we have:
fpAYBq “
$&%fpAq if MpA,ąq ąMpB,ąq,fpBq otherwise. (2.2)
The second example captures the case of strict weighted averaging. The ex-
ample has the same flavour as the standard Luce model of individual choice
behavior (section 2.6 covers average choice functions in more detail).
Example 10. Consider a weight function w : X Ñ R`` on a set of features.
Given any feature x P X, let fpxq P Rn be the outcome of the model based
on observing the single feature x. We define an aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn










This form of aggregation also satisfies the weighted averaging axiom. The rea-



















In this case, since the weights are strictly positive, the aggregation rule satisfies
the strict weighted averaging.
These examples are two separate and simple forms of aggregation rules. Both
satisfy the weighted averaging axiom. The main result of the next section
shows that the combination of these two special cases is the whole class of
aggregation rules under the weighted averaging axiom.
We should mention that both the weighted averaging axiom and strict weighted
averaging axiom are closely related to the concatenation axiom of Billot et al.
(2005) in the context of case-based prediction, path independence or Plott’s
condition of Plott (1973), partial path independence of Ahn et al. (2018) in
the context of stochastic choice functions, extended Pareto axiom of Dhillon
(1998) and Baucells and Shapley (2008), and also the coherence axiom of
Skiadas (1997a) in the context of preference aggregation rules. Sections 2.5,
2.6, 3.2, and 4.2 describe the connections of these axioms.
But first, in Section 2.3, we provide the representation of aggregation rules
under the weighted averaging axiom and special cases. Then, in Section 2.4, by
providing a norm over the set of features, X, we define continuous aggregation
rules, and get our last representation for the case of continuous aggregation
rules.
2.3 Main Representation
This section presents our main representation. Examples 9 and 10 in Section
2.2, show two simple forms of aggregation satisfying the weighted averaging
axiom. Our main result, under a technical richness condition, shows that the
class of aggregation rules under the weighted averaging axiom consists of the
combination of these two simple forms of aggregation rules.
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Before stating our main result, we present the special case of the representation
under the strict weighted averaging axiom. We show that under a technical
richness condition, all aggregation rules satisfying the strict version have the
simple form of Example 10.
In this case, the richness condition determines that the range of the aggregation
rule should be more than a single line. Formally, we have:
Definition 8. An aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn is rich if the range of f is
not a subset of a line.
The above condition means that we can always find three disjoint features
such that under the aggregation rule they form a triangle in Rn.
The special case of our main result is as follows:
Theorem 4. Let an aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn satisfy the richness condi-
tion. The following are equivalent:
1. The aggregation rule f satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom.







Moreover, the function w is unique up to multiplication by a positive number.
The strict weighted averaging axiom states that for any A,B P X˚, there
exists a weight λA,B,AYB P p0, 1q, possibly depending on A,B, and AYB, such
that fpA Y Bq “ λA,B,AYBfpAq ` p1 ´ λA,B,AYBqfpBq. However, this result
shows that there should be a strictly positive weight function w over the set





wpyq . The complete proof of the result is in
the appendix.
The previous representation is the building block of our main representation.
However, to get the representation, we need a stronger richness condition.
Definition 9. An aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn is strongly rich if for any
x P X there exist two other different features y, z P X such that:
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1. fptx, yuq R tfpxq, fpyqu and fptx, zuq R tfpxq, fpzqu3.
2. fptxuq, fptyuq, and fptzuq are not on the same line.
The condition states that for any feature, we can find another two features that
(1) their aggregated coalitions satisfy the strict weighted averaging axiom, (2)
they are non-collinear in the range of f .
The idea behind the strong richness condition and the richness condition fol-
lows from the main representation. We provide the discussion after the main
result.
Our main result shows that we can identify the class of aggregation rules
under the weighted averaging axiom as long as they satisfy the strong richness
condition. The representation is a combination of the rules in Example 9 and
10. The main representation is as follows:
Theorem 5. Let an aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn be strongly rich. The
following are equivalent:
1. The aggregation rule f satisfies the weighted averaging axiom.
2. There exist a unique weak order ě on X and a weight function w : X Ñ









Moreover in this case, the function w is unique up to multiplication by a pos-
itive number in each of the equivalence classes of the weak order ě.
There are two forces behind the representation: one is captured by the weak
order ě; the other is the weight function w.
The weak order plays the role it has in example 9. It partitions the set of
features into equivalence classes and ranks them from top to bottom. If all
features of a coalition have the same ranking, then the outcome is the weighted
3In the proof of our main result, we show that as long as fptxuq, fptyuq, and fptzuq are
not on the same line, then fptx, yuq R tfpxq, fpyqu and fptx, zuq R tfpxq, fpzqu ñ fpty, zuq R
tfpyq, fpzqu.
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average of the outcomes of each member of the coalition. However, if some
features have a higher ranking than others, then the aggregation rule will
ignore the lower-ordered features.
Hence, the assessment of the aggregation rule has two steps. First, it only
considers the highest-ordered elements. Then, it uses the weight function and
finds the weighted average among the highest-ordered features.
The importance of the representation is that the weighted averaging axiom
states that for any A,B P X˚, there exists a weight λA,B,AYB P r0, 1s, possibly
depending on A,B, and A Y B, such that fpA Y Bq “ λA,B,AYBfpAq ` p1 ´
λA,B,AYBqfpBq. However, Theorem 5 shows that there should be a weak order
ě and a strictly positive weight function w over the set of features and for any







The idea behind the proof is as follows. First, we define an order ě over binary
coalitions. Given x, y P X, if fpxq ‰ fpyq we define x ě y if fptx, yuq ‰ fpyq.
Using the strong richness condition, we prove that this order is transitive.
Moreover, we can make it into a complete order. In the next step we show
that for any coalition A, fpAq “ fpMpA,ěqq. This part of the proof is the
most difficult part. Finally, the strong richness condition states that in each
equivalence class of the weak order ě, there should be three non-collinear
points. Hence, we use the result of Theorem 4 and in each equivalence class.
In other words, we can find the weight function that represents the rule in
each equivalence class. The conditions that (1) fpAq “ fpMpA,ěqq and (2)
all points in MpA,ěq are in a same equivalence class, will complete the proof.
In both of the representations above, the richness condition is crucial. The
following example shows that without the richness, there are aggregation rules
that satisfy the strict weighted averaging axiom, but do not have a weighted
average representation.
Example 11. Let X “ tx, y, zu with fptxuq “ 0, fptyuq “ 1{2, fptzuq “
1, fptx, yuq “ 1{4, fpty, zuq “ 3{4, fptx, zuq “ 3{8, and fptx, y, zuq “ 7{16.
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Assume that there exists a positive weight function on X, and the aggregation
rule over any coalition of X has a representation as a weighted average of its
elements.
Assume that w : X Ñ R`` is the corresponding weight function. In order
to have such a representation, we should have fptx, yuq “ wpxqfpxq`wpyqfpyq
wpxq`wpyq .
By considering the value of fptx, yuq, fptxuq, and fptyuq, we get wpxq
wpyq “ 1.
Similarly, by considering the coalition ty, zu we get wpyq
wpzq “ 1. By combining
these two observations, we get wpxq
wpzq “ 1. However, considering the coalition
tx, zu, and the representation fptx, zuq “ wpxqfpxq`wpzqfpzq
wpxq`wpzq , we get
wpxq
wpzq “ 5{3,
which is a contradiction. Hence, the representation does not work in this case.
The problem with the example is that the range of the aggregation rule is a
subset of a single dimensional vector space. Therefore, it does not satisfy the
richness condition.
The example also shows the reason behind the strong richness condition in
Theorem 5. To be able to define a weight function in each equivalence class
of the weak order ě, the aggregation rule should satisfy the richness in each
equivalence class. This is precisely the idea behind the definition of the strong
richness condition: the first condition states that the three points are in a same
equivalence class. The second condition states that they are non-collinear.
Remark 8. In the case of aggregation rules under the strict weighted aver-
aging axiom, the richness condition is equivalent to the strong richness con-
dition. Since, if an aggregation f : X˚ Ñ Rn satisfies the richness condi-
tion, there exist three non-collinear vectors fptxuq, fptyuq, and fptzuq in
the range on f . Under the strict weighted averaging axiom, the vectors
fptx, yuq P Conv˝ptfptxuq, fptyuquq and fptx, zuq P Conv˝ptfptxuq, fptzuquq.
Therefore, f satisfies the strong weighted averaging axiom. This means that
Theorem 4 is a corollary of Theorem 5.
Remark 9. Note that, by the richness condition, the dimension of the range of
the aggregation rule should be at least 2. As a result, the dimension of Rn in
the definition of aggregation rules should be strictly more than 1.
Remark 10. As a consequence of Theorem 4, for any two members of the space
X, the ratio of their weights in any coalition is constant. This observation
guarantees that by only considering the coalition of any two features, we can
get the ratio of their weights in any coalition containing them. Instead of the
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strict weighted averaging axiom, by fixing the ratio of weights of two features in
any coalition including them, we can get a similar result as Theorem 4. This
observation is closely related to the independent of irrelevant of alternative
axiom of Luce (1959), which is discussed in detail in Section 2.6.2.
The next section shows that for continuous aggregation rules over a convex
domain, the weighted averaging axiom is the same as the strict weighted av-
eraging axiom. Therefore, the weak order ě in the main representation has
only one equivalence class.
2.4 Continuous Aggregation Rules
In this section, in order to discuss the closeness of members of coalitions, we
assume that X is a subset of a normed vector space. Two features of X are
close to each other if their distance, with respect to the norm on X, is close
to each other.
One appealing property of an aggregation rule would be that by replacing a
member of a coalition with another feature close to that member, the value
of the aggregation rule over this new coalition stays close to the value of the
aggregation rule over the previous coalition. To capture this idea, we define a
continuous aggregation rule as follows:
Axiom 4. (Continuity) An aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn is continuous
if, for any coalition A P X˚ Y tHu, and any feature x P XzA, if a sequence
pxnq8n“1 P X and xn Ñ x, then:
fpAY txnuq Ñ fpAY txuq.
Remark 11. In the definition of the previous axiom, convergence in X is with
respect to the norm on X, and the convergence in the range of the aggregation
rule is with respect to the Euclidean norm of Rn.
By considering a continuous aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn and a single-
element coalition txu P X˚, if xn P X and xn Ñ x, then by the definition of
the continuity, we should have: fptxnuq Ñ fptxuq. In other words, the value
of an aggregation rule over a feature close to a particular feature is close to
the value of the aggregation rule over that particular feature.
By adding the weighted averaging axiom, we can get the representation in The-
orem 5. The next theorem shows that for continuous aggregation rules under
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the weighted averaging axiom, the weight function in the representation is also
a continuous function. In other words, not only the values of the aggregation
rule of two close features are close, but also their weights are close. Moreover,
if two features are close enough, they are in the same equivalence class of the
weak order ě. In other words, they have the same ranking. Formally, we have:
Theorem 6. Let X be a subset of a normed vector space and an aggregation
rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn be strongly rich and satisfy weighted averaging axiom. By
Theorem 5 there exist a unique weak order ě on X and a weight function







Moreover, if f is continuous, then:
1. The weight function w is continuous, i.e., for any x P X and a sequence
pxnq8n“1 P X such that xn Ñ x, then wpxnq Ñ wpxq.
2. For any x P X, there exists a neighborhood Nx of x such that for all
y P Nx X X: y „ x. In other words, @ x P X D  ą 0 such that
@ y P Bpxq : y „ x, where Bpxq “ tz|z P X, |z ´ x| ă u.
Next, we assume that X is a convex subset of a normed vector space. Our
next theorem shows that under this assumption, any continuous aggregation
rule on X under weighted averaging axiom can only have a single equivalence
class. To clarify, for any x P X , not only any feature close enough to x has
the same order as x, but also all other members of X has the same order as x.
The theorem states that under a convex domain, for continuous aggregation
rules, there is no difference between the weighted averaging axiom and strict
weighted averaging axiom.
Theorem 7. Let X be a convex subset of a normed vector space, and f : X˚ Ñ
Rn a rich aggregation rule that satisfies weighted averaging and continuity
axioms. Then, there exists a continuous weight function w : X Ñ R`` such








The proof is simple. Therefore, we include it here.
Proof. We prove Theorem 7 by contradiction. Assume that there exist x, y P X
such that x  y. Without loss of generality, we assume that fpxq ‰ fpyq.
Since if fpxq “ fpyq, by the strong richness condition there exists another
point z P X in which z „ x and fpzq ‰ fpxq, and we can use z instead of x.
Hence, assume that x  y and fpxq ‰ fpyq. By convexity of X, the whole
segment rx, ys “ tαx ` p1 ´ αqy | α P r0, 1su should be in X. Define a
point α1 P r0, 1s as inftα | α P r0, 1s, αx ` p1 ´ αqy  xu. The “inf” is
well defined, since it is defined on a bounded subset of r0, 1s and additionally
x  y, fpxq ‰ fpyq.
Consider the point z “ α1x ` p1 ´ α1qy. First, we prove that the point z is
different than x. By the result of Theorem 6, the point x has a neighborhood
Bpxq with all points in this neighborhood having the same order as x. By
considering Bpxq X rx, ys, z is different than x. Similarly, z is different than
y.
By Theorem 6, there exists a neighborhood B1pzq of z such that all points in
the neighborhood have the same order as z. By considering the set B1pzq X
rx, ys and the fact that z ‰ x and z ‰ y, α1 cannot be inftα| α P r0, 1s, αx`
p1´ αqy  xu, which is a contradiction.
The contradiction proves that all points in X have the same order with respect
to the weak order ě, which completes the proof.
We can interpret the representation as an impossibility result. It means that
it is not possible to have the extreme case and continuity. This interpretation
is especially useful in the context of choice theory. We show that this is a
more general version of the impossibility result by Kalai and Megiddo (1980).
Section 2.6.3 covers the interpretation.
2.5 Belief Formation
In this section, we discuss an application of our main results in the context
of Belief Formation. The role of an aggregation rule is an agent who makes
a prediction about the true state of nature, based on observing some signals
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containing information about the true state. In this context, the range of an
aggregation rule is the probability distributions over the states of nature.
Section 2.5.1 provides the main definitions and application of our main result
in this context. In Section 2.5.2, we consider an extension where the timing of
signals changes their credibility. Finally, in Section 2.5.3, by interpreting the
set of signals as the agent’s information structure, we find the necessary and
sufficient condition that a belief formation is a Bayes updater.
2.5.1 Belief Formation Processes
Let Ω “ t1, 2, . . . , nu be a set of states of nature. Depending on the application,
there might be different interpretations of the elements of X as disjoint cases,
events, or experts such that each has some information about the true state.
To be consistent, we interpret the elements of the set X as disjoint signals.
The role of an aggregation rule over a finite subset of signals is to predict
the true state of nature by assigning probabilities to each state. Therefore,
following Billot et al. (2005), the aggregation rules can be interpreted as a belief
formation process, in which by observing a finite subset of signals it assigns a
belief to the set of states of nature. More precisely, let ∆pΩq be the set of all
probability distributions over the set of states of nature.
Definition 10. A belief formation process is a function f : X˚ Ñ ∆pΩq,
that associates with every finite set of signals A P X˚, a belief fpAq P ∆pΩq
on the states of nature.
Theorem 5 shows that if the belief induced by the union of two disjoint finite
sets of signals is on the line segment connecting the beliefs induced by each set
of signals separately, then, under the strong richness condition, there exists a
strictly positive weight function and a weak order over the set of signals such
that the belief over any finite subset of signals is a weighted average of the
beliefs induced by each of the highest-ordered signals of that subset.
By enforcing the belief formation process to use both of the induced beliefs,
i.e., the belief induced by the union of two disjoint finite sets of signals is on
the “interior” of the line segment connecting the induced belief of each set of
signals separately, we can use Theorem 4 to find the representation. Formally,
we have:
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Corollary 3. Let a belief formation process f : X˚ Ñ ∆pΩq be strongly rich
and satisfies weighted averaging axiom. Then, there exist a unique weak order









Moreover, if the function f satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom, then








The special case of the representation above, under the strict weighted av-
eraging axiom, is similar to the one in Billot et al. (2005). However, their
belief formation process is defined over “sequences” of signals, in which each
sequence can have multiple copies of the same signal. In contrast, we define
the belief formation process over “sets” of signals, and there can be only one
copy of a signal in each set. Billot et al.’s main axiom, concatenation axiom, is
defined over any two sequence of signals, and the role is to count the number
of each signals in each sequence. However, our strict weighted averaging axiom
does not allow the same signal to be in sub-coalitions, which is crucial for our
representation (otherwise, since we have the “union”, the representation does
not hold).
As a result, besides the conceptual differences, there is a mathematical dif-
ference between the concatenation axiom and our strict weighted averaging
axiom.
2.5.2 Role of Timing
In this section, we explore the role of the timing of signals. We assume that
an agent may receive signals in different time zones in the past. Among a
set of received signals, the agent may perceive a signal closer to the time of
the prediction as more credible compared to the same signal if it was received
further in the past. Therefore, the agent may add more weight to the belief
induced by that specific signal if it was received closer to the time of the
prediction.
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To capture the idea, in the rest of this section, we assume that a belief forma-
tion process receives signals in possibly different time zones in the past and it
tries to form a belief at the present time.
We show that if a belief induced by a set of received signals and their timing
is the same as the belief induced by a constant shift of timings of the same
received signals, then the belief formation process, under the strict weighted
averaging axiom, has a simple form:
There exist a weight function over each signal and an exponential discount
factor over the timing. The belief induced by a set of received signals is just
the discounted weighted average of the beliefs induced by each of the received
signals separately.
Formally, let X be the set of signals. The present time denoted by 0, and
time t P N represents t units of time before the present time. For a given
finite subset of signals A P X˚, let a function TA : A Ñ N, represent the
timing of each signal in the set A, i.e., for any signal x P A, TApxq is the
time of receiving the signal x. Given a c P N, TA ` c represents a time shift
of size c over the timing TA of a set of received signals A. Finally, the set
XT “ tpA, TAq | A P X˚, TA : A Ñ Nu represents all possible realizations of
the received signals. In this context, a belief formation process is a function
f : XT Ñ ∆pΩq.
Our main axiom, in addition to the strict weighted averaging axiom, is the
stationarity axiom. A belief formation process is stationary if a belief induced
by a set of received signals and their timing is the same as the belief induced
by a constant shift of timings of the same received signals. More precisely:
Axiom 5. (Stationary) If A P X˚, TA : AÑ N, then for any c P N:
fppA, TA ` cqq “ fpA, TAq.
The stationarity axiom specifies that shift of the timing of signals, with the
number for all the signals, does not change the belief.
The next proposition characterizes the belief formation processes under both
the stationarity and strict weighted averaging axioms.
Proposition 9. Let a rich belief formation process f : XT Ñ ∆pΩq satisfy the
strict weighted averaging and stationarity axioms. Then, there exist a unique
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discount factor q P p0,8q and a unique (up to multiplication by a positive







The idea behind the proof is to use the uniqueness of the weight w in Theorem
4. Next, by using the stationarity axiom, we show that there is a constant q,
in which by moving the timing of any signal in a coalition A P X˚ to one
unit in the past and keeping the timing of others the same, its relative weight
compared to other elements scales by q.
As a consequence of the representation, under the assumption of the proposi-
tion, the weight over a received signal x P A can be separated into two separate
entities. One is the intrinsic value of the signal, captured by wpxq. The other
one is the role of timing, captured by qTApxq. Moreover, the only discounting
that captures the role of the timing is the exponential form.
If q “ 1, the timing is not important. Hence, the belief formation process only
considers the intrinsic value of each signal. However, when q ‰ 1, the belief
formation process places relatively more weight, in the case of q P p0, 1q, and
less weight, in the case of q P p1,8q, on a signal received closer to the time of
the prediction.
2.5.3 Bayesian Updating
In this section, the set of signals represents the information structure of an
agent who wants to predict the true state of nature. We interpret each subset
of signals as an event in her information structure. We show that as long as
the information structure has a finite cardinality, the strict weighted averaging
axiom is the necessary and sufficient condition for a rich belief formation pro-
cess to appear as a Bayesian updater. In other words, the belief formation (1)
attaches a probability measure to each event; (2) by observing a set of disjoint
events, she updates her belief through the Bayes rule.
Formally, let pX,X˚ Y tHuq be the measure space of events, where X has a
finite number of disjoint events. The space of events captures the information
structure of the belief formation process. Similarly, by considering the set Ω “
t1, . . . , nu, we denote pΩ, 2Ωq as the measure space of states of nature, where
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2Ω is the set of subsets of the set Ω. For any probability distribution d P ∆pΩq
and any subset of the state of nature B P Ω, let dpBq denote the probability
of B which is induced by the distribution d. Hence, dpBq “ řωPB dpωq.
Definition 11. A belief formation process f : X˚ Ñ ∆pΩq is Bayesian , if
there exists a probability measure P on the space pΩ ˆ X, 2ΩˆXq, such that
for every A P X˚ and B P 2Ω we have:`
fpAq˘pBq “ P pB ˆ Aq
PXpAq , (2.6)
where, PX is the marginal probability distribution of P over X.
The right hand side of the previous equation is the conditional probability
of B given A. Therefore, a Bayesian belief formation process f behaves as a
Bayesian updater: by observing an event A in her information structure X˚,
her prediction about the probability of the true state being in a subset B P Ω
comes from the Bayes rule. To put it differently,
`
fpAq˘pBq is equal to the
conditional probability P pB|Aq.
Our next proposition shows that our strict weighted averaging axiom is the
necessary and sufficient condition for a rich belief formation process to be
Bayesian. Since the result is an immediate consequence of our Theorem 4, we
put the proof right after the proposition.
Proposition 10. A rich belief formation process is Bayesian if and only if it
satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom.
Proof. First, we prove the necessary part. Let the probability measure P
rationalize a belief formation process f : X˚ Ñ ∆pΩq. Consider two disjoint





PXpA1YA2q for all B P 2Ω. Since A1 XA2 “ H, we have P pB ˆ pA1 YA2qq “




˘pBq “ P pBˆpA1YA2qq
PXpA1YA2q “ PXpA1qPXpA1q`PXpA2q P pBˆA1qPXpA1q ` PXpA2qPXpA1q`PXpA2q P pBˆA2qPXpA2q .
By defining the λ :“ PXpA1q







˘pBq ` p1 ´ λq`fpA2q˘pBq. Therefore, fpA1 Y A2q “ λfpA1q ` p1 ´
λqfpA2q. Hence, f satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom.
Since f is rationalizable by P , in equation 2.6, in order for f to be well de-
fined, the denominator should be positive, i.e., for all A P X˚, PXpAq ą 0.
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Therefore, λ ą 0. As a result, f satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom.
For the sufficient part, if a rich function f : X˚ Ñ ∆pΩq satisfies the strict
weighted averaging axiom, then by applying Theorem 5, there exists a positive

















Since the space X is finite,
ř
xPX
wpxq ă 8. Hence, for every A P X˚ and B P 2Ω,
the probability measure P on the measurable space pΩˆX, 2Ω ˆX˚q can be











wpxq . Since each fpxq is a probability
measure, the marginal distribution of P over X is just PXpAq “ ř
xPA
wpxq.
Therefore, by equation 2.7, for all A P X˚ and B P 2Ω, we have:`
fpAq˘pBq “ P pB ˆ Aq
PXpAq .
This representation completes the proof.
Note that the richness condition is crucial. Otherwise, as shown in Example
11, there are cases where a belief formation process satisfies the strict weighted
averaging axiom, but it is not a Bayesian updater.
Remark 12. In our proof, it is necessary that the set of disjoint events, X, be a
finite set. Otherwise, with the same technique, we can show that there exists a
finite additive measure P that rationalizes the belief formation process under
the strict weighted averaging axiom. However, the measure is not a probability
measure.
Remark 13. Since the range of a belief formation process is in the simplex
∆n´1 “ tp| p P Rn, řni“1 pi “ 1u, the dimension of the range of f is at most
the dimension of ∆n´1, which is n´1. Therefore, in order for a belief formation
process to satisfy the richness condition, the dimension of the space Ω should
be at least 3.
63
We can show the more general form of the result by adding the strong richness
condition and weakening the strict weighted averaging axiom to the weighted
averaging axiom. In the more general form, it is possible to have zero prob-
ability events. The belief formation process behaves as a Bayesian updater
even conditional on observing a zero probability event. To capture the idea,
we need the following definition.
Definition 12. A class of functions tPA| PA : 2Ω ˆX˚ Ñ r0, 1s, A P X˚u is
a conditional probability system if it satisfies the following properties:
1. For every H ‰ A P X˚, PA is a probability measure on Ω ˆ X with
PApΩˆ Aq “ 1.
2. For every disjoint events A1, A2 P X˚ and for every C P ΩˆX, we have:
PA1YA2pCq “ PA1YA2pΩˆ A1qPA1pCq ` PA1YA2pΩˆ A2qPA2pCq.
In the definition above, the probability measure PΩ represents the agent’s ex-
ante prediction. Suppose the agent received information in the form of an
event A P X˚. The probability measure PA represents the agent’s ex-post
prediction, which is a conditional probability measure given the event A. It
means that for any set B P Ω, PApB ˆ Aq is the conditional probability of B
given A. Moreover, for any two events A2 Ă A1 in X˚, PA1pΩ ˆ A2q is the
conditional probability of event A2 given A1.
In the definition, the first property states that the agent, conditional on real-
izing an event A in her information structure, does not put any probability on
the complement event Ac.
The second property states that regardless of the ex-ante probability of an
event A1 Y A2, conditional on observing A1 Y A2, the Bayes updating rule
should be satisfied. It is important to mention that the ex-ante probability
of the event A1 Y A2, which is PΩpΩ ˆ A1 Y A2q, might be zero. However,
conditional on observing the event A1 Y A2, the ex-post prediction measure
PA1YA2 is the updated prediction.
A belief formation that is rationalizable by a conditional probability system
behaves as a Bayes updater regardless of what event it encounters (even if
the ex-ante probability of an event is zero). By adding the strong richness
condition, the next theorem shows that the weighted averaging axiom is the
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necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizing a belief formation process
by a conditional probability system.
Proposition 11. A strongly rich belief formation process is rationalizable by a
conditional probability system if and only if it satisfies the weighted averaging
axiom.
This proof is similar to the proof of proposition 10. The only difference is that
we use the representation under the weighted averaging axiom to derive the
result. First, we get a weak order and a weight function using Theorem 5.
Then, we can define the probability distribution over each equivalence class of
the weak order similar to the proof of Proposition 10 and put zero probability
over all lower-ordered events. Therefore, we can define the conditional proba-
bility system associated with the belief formation process.
Finally, we should mention that Shmaya et al. (2007) considers the problem of
characterizing the updating rules (in our context the belief formation processes)
that appear to be Bayesian. By providing an example, they show that their
soundness condition, our strict weighted averaging axiom, is not a sufficient
condition for an updating rule to behave as a Bayesian updater. However, we
show that the strict weighted averaging axiom is the necessary and sufficient
condition as long as the belief formation process satisfies our richness condition.
2.6 Average Choice Functions
2.6.1 Primitives
In this section, an aggregation rule represents an agent choosing randomly
from a given menu. The outcome of the aggregation rule is the average choice
(mean of the distribution of choices) rather than the entire distribution of
choices4. Average choice is easier to report and obtain rather than the en-
tire distribution. However, an average choice does not uniquely reveal the
underlying distribution of choices.
Our goal is to show that (1) it is possible to uniquely extract the underlying
distribution of choices as long as the average choice satisfies the weighted
averaging axiom, and (2) there is a connection between our weighted averaging
axiom and the Path Independent, Luce, and two-stage Luce choice models.
4Check Ahn et al. (2018) for the complete discussion of the merits of average choice.
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In this section, X is a nonempty subset of Rn, which is not a subset of a line.
In other words, the dimension of X, defined as the dimension of the smallest
linear variety that contains X, is greater than one. An aggregation rule in this
context is a average choice function, in which over any given menu of choice
objects, chooses an average choice in the convex combination of members of
the menu. Formally we have the following definition:
Definition 13. An aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rn is called an average choice
function , if for any menu A P X˚, fpAq P ConvpAq.
Based on this definition, the choice over any single-element menu is the element
itself. In a larger menu, the value of an average choice function is a vector in
the convex combination of the elements of the menu, which can be viewed as
the mean of a probability distribution over the elements.
Since the choice from any single-element menu is the element itself, given
two different elements in X, the choice from each of them is different. This
property of the average choice functions is more restrictive than the previous
section where there was a possibility that the values of an aggregation rule
over two different single-element menu are the same.
Since average choice functions are a special form of aggregation rules; by
adding the strict weighted averaging axiom, the weighted averaging axiom,
or the continuity, we can get the representations of the previous section. In
this context, the weighted averaging axiom specifies that the choice from the
union of two disjoint menus is on the line segment joining the choices from
each of the menus.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 5, for any average choice function under
the weighted averaging axiom, with a minor richness condition, there exist a
weight function and a weak order over elements such that the choice from any
menu is just the weighted average (with respect to the weight function) of the
highest order (with respect to the weak order relation) elements of the menu.
Adding continuity requires the elements to have the same order with respect to
the weak order relation. Under the representation of Theorem 7, the average
choice from any given menu is just the weighted average of the menu. To be
more precise, and as a starting point for our discussion, we have the following
corollary:
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Corollary 4. Let an average choice function f : X˚ Ñ ConvpXq be strongly
rich. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The average choice function f satisfies the weighted averaging axiom.
2. There exists a unique weak order ě on X and a unique weight function
w : X Ñ R``, up to multiplication over equivalence classes of the weak














Moreover, if the average choice function f satisfies continuity and the weighted
averaging axiom, the weight function w is continuous and the weak order ě is













Using the results of this corollary, in the following two subsections, we look
into two forms of choice behavior captured by the weighted averaging axiom.
In Section 2.6.2, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for an average
choice function to be rationalizable by a Luce Model. Then, we generalize the
result and provide the class of all average choice functions rationalizable by a
two-stage Luce Model. In Section 2.6.3, we provide a stronger version of the
impossibility result by Kalai and Megiddo (1980), regarding the impossibility
of a choice function satisfying both the path independence axiom , proposed
by Plott (1973), and continuity.
2.6.2 Luce Rationalizable Average Choice Functions
In this section, we show that any average choice function under the weighted
averaging axiom can be rationalized by a two-stage Luce rule. As discussed in
Section 2.6.1, except for the case that elements of a menu are affinely indepen-
dent, average choice does not uniquely reveal the underlying distribution of
choices. However, we show that under the strong richness condition the two-
stage Luce model is the only choice model that satisfies the weighted averaging
axiom.
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In the rest of this section, first we consider a special case. We show that the
Luce model is the only choice model satisfying the strict weighted averaging
axiom. Therefore, the strict weighted averaging axiom is conceptually equiva-
lent to the Luce’s independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, which states
that the probability of selecting one element over another in all menus con-
taining both of them should be the same. Following the first result, we show
the more general case, in which the two-stage Luce model is the only choice
model satisfying the weaker weighted averaging axiom.
The following definitions are standard definitions in the context of individual
decision making.
Definition 14. A stochastic choice is a function ρ : X˚ Ñ ∆pXq, that for
any A P X˚, ρpAq P ∆pAq.
For an average choice function f : X˚ Ñ ConvpXq and a menu A P X˚,
fpAq P ConvpAq. Therefore, there exists a stochastic choice ρ : X˚ Ñ ∆pXq
(which may not be unique) that rationalizes the average choice function f ,
i.e., fpAq “ řxPA ρpx,Aqx, where ρpx,Aq is the probability of selecting the
element x from the menu A.
One appealing form of a stochastic choice function is the one that satisfies
Luce’s IIA, i.e., the probability of selecting an element over another element
is independent of any other element. Luce (1959) shows that stochastic choices
that satisfy the IIA axiom are in the form of Luce rules.
Definition 15. A stochastic choice ρ : X˚ Ñ ∆pXq is a Luce rule if there




Furthermore, if w is continuous, then ρ is a continuous Luce rule.
Definition 16. An average choice function f is rationalizable by a stochastic





Furthermore, if there exists a Luce rule that rationalizes the average choice
function f , then f is Luce rationalizable.
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By considering our Theorem 4 and corollary 4, a choice f has a Luce form




wpxqqx if and only if it satisfies the strict
weighted averaging axiom. As a result:
Corollary 5. An average choice function is Luce rationalizable if and only if
it satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom. Moreover, the Luce rule that
rationalizes the average choice function is unique.
Furthermore, an average choice function is continuous Luce rationalizable if
and only if it satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom and continuity.
In the Luce model, the decision maker selects each element of a given menu
with a strictly positive probability. However, this is not a plausible assumption
in many situation. The decision maker may always select a better choice
between two alternatives. We model this behavior by a two-stage Luce model.
Echenique et al. (2018) introduce the two-stage Luce model. In this model,
there exist a ranking order and a weight function over elements. A decision
maker facing a menu only selects the highest-ordered elements from the menu.
The probability of the selection of each highest-ordered element is related to
the weight associated with the element. Formally:
Definition 17. A stochastic choice ρ : X˚ Ñ ∆pXq is a two-stage Luce
rule if there are a function w : X Ñ R`` and a weak order ě over elements




yPMpA,ěq wpyq if x PMpA,ěq,
0 otherwise.
(2.10)
Given a menu A, the decision maker only selects the elements in MpA,ěq, that
are the highest-ordered elements of A. She chooses each element of MpA,ěq
with a probability associated with its weight.
By considering our Theorem 5, any average choice function under the weighted
averaging axiom is rationalizable by a two-stage Luce rule.
Corollary 6. A strongly rich average choice function is two-stage Luce ratio-
nalizable if and only if it satisfies the weighted averaging axiom. Moreover, the
two-stage Luce rule that rationalizes the average choice function is unique.
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Remark 14. Note that by adding the continuity axiom using our Theorem
7, both the two-stage Luce model and Luce model are equivalent. The next
section discusses this observation in more detail.
2.6.3 Continuous Average Choice Functions
In this section, we consider the class of average choice functions satisfying
both the weighted averaging axiom and continuity. First, we reinterpret our
corollary 4 as an impossibility result. This means that no continuous average
choice function is rationalizable by a two-stage Luce model but not by a Luce
model. Then, we show the connection with the impossibility result by Kalai
and Megiddo (1980), regarding the impossibility of a choice function satisfying
both the path independence and continuity.
Plott (1973) extensively studies choice functions under the path independence
axiom. Plott’s notion of path independence requires a choice from the union of
two disjoint menu AYB, to be the choice between the choice from A and the
choice from B. Using his axiom, the choice from any menu can be recursively
obtained by partitioning the elements of the menu into disjoint sub-menus.
Then, the choice from the whole menu would be the choice from the choices
of each sub-menu. In our setup, for an average choice function f , we have:
Axiom 6. (Path Independence) If A,B P X˚ and AXB “ H, then
fpAYBq “ fptfpAq, fpBquq.
The path independence axiom is stronger than our weighted averaging axiom.
In other words, any average choice function under Plott’s notion of path in-
dependence satisfies the weighted averaging axiom. More precisely, given a
choice function f : X˚ Ñ ConvpXq and two disjoint menus A,B P X˚, under
the path independence axiom, fpAYBq “ fpfpAq, fpBqq. By the definition of
average choice functions, fptfpAq, fpBquq P ConvpfpAq, fpBqq, which shows
that the choice function f satisfies the weighted averaging axiom.
As discussed in Section 2.4, continuity is an appealing property of an average
choice function. It specifies that by replacing an element of a menu with
another element close to it, with respect to the norm of X, the average choice
of the new menu is close to the average choice of the previous menu.
Kalai and Megiddo (1980) show that there is no average choice function that
satisfies both path independence axiom and continuity. Here, we reinterpret
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the result of Corollary 4 to show a more general result for average choice
functions.
Corollary 4 states that for an average choice function f : X˚ Ñ ConvpXq
under continuity and the weighted averaging axiom, as long as it satisfies the
strong richness condition, there exists a unique weight function w : X Ñ R``







There are two important observations regarding the representations above.
First, through discussions in Section 2.6.2, the representation shows that any
continuous average choice function that is rationalizable by a two-stage Luce
model is also rationalizable by a Luce model. Second, since the function w
is strictly positive, the average choice of any menu should be in the relative
interior of the convex hull of members of the menu.
As a result, our impossibility result specifies that for an average choice function
that satisfies the weighted averaging axiom, it is impossible to satisfy the
continuity axiom and also to have a choice from a menu that is on the relative
boundary of the elements of the menu. We summarize the observation in the
following corollary.
Corollary 7. If X is a nonempty convex subset of a vector space that contains
at least three non-collinear points, then an average choice function f : X˚ Ñ
X that satisfies the weighted averaging axiom cannot be both continuous and
contains a menu A P X˚, with fpAq P BrpConvpAqq.
To see the connection between our corollary 7 and the result in Kalai and
Megiddo (1980), it is enough to consider a menu with three non-collinear
members. Theorem 1 in Kalai and Megiddo (1980) shows that the average
choice of a path independent average choice function from any menu is the
average choice of the average choice function from a sub-menu of two members
of the menu. This shows that the average choice from a menu with three non-
collinear members is on the line segment connecting two of the member of the
menu. As a result, the choice should be on the relative boundary of the menu.
That is why it cannot satisfy continuity.
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2.7 Related Literature
Our methods are applicable to different areas of economic theory, and gen-
eralize existing ideas in those areas. In particular, instances of our weighted
averaging axiom appears in several different papers.
The theory of Case-Based Prediction is developed by the seminal works of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (2012) and Billot
et al. (2005). In this context, the concatenation axiom proposed by Billot
et al. (2005), is closely related to the strict case of our axiom. However, there
are differences between the two axioms. As discussed in more detail in Section
2.5.1, their belief formation process is defined over “sequences” of cases, in
which each sequence can have multiple copies of the same case. The role of
the concatenation axiom is to count the number of each case. However, in
our framework, we define our axiom over “sets” of signals, in which in each
set there is only one copy of each signal. Moreover, our axiom is defined over
disjoint sets. By weakening our definition for any two general sets, our result
does not hold anymore.
In the paper by Shmaya et al. (2007), they provide an example, on binary state
space, to show that their soundness condition is not a sufficient condition for
an updating rule to behave as a Bayesian rule. However, we show that under
our richness assumption, the strict weighted averaging axiom (which is the
same as their soundness condition) is the necessary and sufficient condition
for an updating rule to behave as a Bayesian. We also generalize our result for
the class of updating rules that can be rationalized by a conditional probability
system.
In the context of choice theory, Ahn et al. (2018) introduce a model of contin-
uous average choice over convex domains. In this application, we generalized
their result in many ways. First, their result holds for the strict case of our
axiom. Moreover, continuity and convexity are the two important forces be-
hind their result. However, we show that the strictness of an average choice
function, continuity, or convexity of the domain are not the main forces be-
hind extracting the underlying distribution of choices. The main force is our
weighted averaging axiom. Moreover, we show that it is possible to rationalize
an average choice function by a two-stage Luce model, as long as it satisfies
our weighted averaging axiom.
The path independence choice functions are extensively studied by Plott (1973).
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Our representation of average choice functions under the weighted averaging
axiom and continuity, generalizes the results by Kalai and Megiddo (1980) and
Machina and Parks (1981), regarding the impossibility of a choice function un-
der both the path independence and the continuity.
73
C h a p t e r 3
EXTENDED PARETO AGGREGATION
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of aggregation of preference ordering
of a group of individuals to form a social preference ordering. The goal is to
find an aggregation procedure with some appealing properties. In our setup
each preference ordering satisfies the axiom of Von-Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944). The role of an aggregation rule is to associate with each coalition of
individuals another vN-M preference ordering over the set of alternatives.
An appealing property of an aggregation rule, in this context, is to satisfy the
extended Pareto axiom. Shapley and Shubik (1982) introduced the extended
Pareto. It specifies that, if two disjoint coalitions of individuals, each prefers
an outcome over another outcome, then the union of the coalitions also should
prefer the same outcome over the other one. Moreover, if one of them strictly
prefers one outcome over the other one, then the union of the coalitions should
also strictly prefer the same outcome over the other one.
First, we show that under a normalization of cardinal utilities of individuals
and a minor richness condition, aggregation rules under the strict weighted
averaging (weighted averaging) axiom are exactly aggregation rules under the
extended Pareto (extended weak Pareto) axiom.
Following the equivalence, we use our main representation result on weighted
averaging aggregation rules as a technical tool to pin down the representation
of the extended Pareto aggregation rules. We show that the only possible
extended Pareto aggregation is to have a positive weight over each individual
in the society. Then, the aggregated preference ordering of a given group of
individual is the weighted sum of their preference ordering.
The representation can be considered as a generalization of the theorem by
Harsanyi (1955) on utilitarianism. Harsanyi considers a single profile of in-
dividuals and a variant of Pareto to get the Utilitarianism. However, in our
approach, we partition a profile to smaller groups. Then, we aggregate the
preference ordering of these smaller groups using the extended Pareto. Hence,
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we get the Utilitarianism through this consistent form of aggregation. As a re-
sult, in our representation, the weight associated with each individual appears
in all sub-profiles that contain her.1
We provide two more applications of this representation. One is a result with a
positive nature on social choice functions, which we discussed in Section 3.2.3.
The other application is to provide a subjective conditional expected theory
of state-dependent preferences, which we discuss in Section 4.2.
In Section 3.2.3, we extend our result on extended Pareto aggregation rules
to the class of generalized social welfare function. Unlike our previous model,
each individual may have any different preference ordering. Therefore, the
domain of the generalized social welfare function is a set of all different groups
(with all possible sizes) of individuals with each individual having all differ-
ent possible preference orderings. Our definition of generalized social welfare
function extends the standard definition used by Arrow (1963), in which the
domain is a set of fixed-length profiles of individuals.
For a technical reason, we restrict the set of vN-M preferences to those which
all of them strictly prefer one fixed lottery to another fixed one. We show that
the only possible extended Pareto generalized social welfare functions are the
ones that associate a positive number to each individual’s preferences (unlike
the previous section, in which each weight depends on both the individual and
the whole profile) and it associates each coalition with the weighted sum of
their cardinal utility using the weight associated to their preferences.
The important observation is that, each positive weight in the representation is
independent of the other individuals in any profiles. The weight only depends
on each individual and her own preference ordering.
Our representation above has a positive nature, compare to the claims by Kalai
and N. Schmeidler (1977) and Hylland (1980) that the negative conclusion of
Arrow’s theorem holds even with vN-M preferences. Moreover, the represen-
tation provides an answer to the main concern of Borgers and Choo (2017a)
and Borgers and Choo (2017b) regarding the correctness of the main theorem
of Dhillon (1998).
1 Similar to the discussion of Weymark (1991) regarding the debate of Sen-Harsanyi,
our result is better to be interpreted as a representation rather than a justification of the
utilitarianism.
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Dhillon (1998) by considering a set of axioms, other than the ones by Ar-
row, provides one of the first axiomatizations of relative utilitarianism as a
possibility result. However, Borgers et al. (2017a) shows a counterexample to
their representation. Our representation fixes the error using our variant of
the extended Pareto axiom and our restricted domain of the generalized social
welfare function.
Finally, adding the anonymity and the weak IIA axiom of Dhillon (1998) gives
us the relative utilitarianism as one possible choice of the weight function.
However, the primary concern of our paper is to show that the weighted aver-
aging of preferences is the only generalized social welfare function that respects
extended Pareto. The possible choices of weights are not our focus in this
paper.
3.2 Extended Pareto Aggregation Rules
In this section, each individual has a preference ordering of a set of alterna-
tives. The role of an aggregation rule is to associate with each group of in-
dividuals another preference ordering of alternatives, representing the group’s
aggregated preference.
We consider the class of aggregation rules satisfying the extended Pareto ax-
iom. This means that whenever we partition a group of individual into two
subgroups, if both aggregated preferences of subgroups prefer one alternative
over another, the aggregated preference of the union of the subgroups also
prefers the first alternative over the second.
Section 3.2.1 provides the main definitions. In section 3.2.2, we show that
(1) the extended Pareto is equivalent to the strict weighted averaging axiom,
and (2) Theorem 5 will imply a general version of Harsanyi (1955) famous
theorem on Utilitarianism. Harsanyi considers a single profile of individuals
and a variant of Pareto to obtain Utilitarianism. However, in our approach,
we partition a profile into smaller groups. Then, we aggregate the preference
ordering of these smaller groups using the extended Pareto. Hence, we model
Utilitarianism through this consistent form of aggregation. As a result, in
our representation, the weight associated with each individual appears in all
sub-profiles that contain her. Finally, section 3.2.3 generalizes the result of
section 3.2.2 for generalized social welfare functions by extending the domain
of aggregation rules to the set of all different groups of individuals with each
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individual having all possible preference orderings. We discuss the connection
to relative Utilitarianism at the end of the section.
3.2.1 Primitives and axioms
Let the set M “ t0, 1, . . . ,mu represent m ` 1 pure prospects. The simplex
L “ tpp1, . . . , pmq|řmi“1 pi ď 1, pi ě 0u represents the set of lotteries over the
set M . A lottery p P L associates the probability pi to the prospect i PMzt0u
and 1´řmi“1 pi to the prospect 0.
A vN-M preference over the set L is a preference relation that satisfies the
axioms of Von-Neumann et al. (1944), i.e., it is a weak order that satisfies
both the continuity and independence axiom. Hence, a vN-M preference has
an expected utility representation. We denote the set of all vN-M preferences
over the set of lotteries L, by R. We denote the strict part of the preference
R P R, by R.
Remark 15. Let R P R, be a vN-M preference over the set L. Using the
vN-M Theorem, there exists an affine representation of the preference R. For
notational convenience, we normalize all affine representations to have the
value 0 over the prospect 0. Therefore, there exists a utility u P Rm that
represents R, i.e., for any two lotteries x, y P L, xRy if and only if u ¨x ě u ¨y,
where “¨” represents the inner product in Rm. Moreover, the “unique” ray
U “ tαu| α ą 0u contains all normalized affine utilities that represent the
vN-M preference R.
In this section, we interpret each feature as an individual. The set of features
X “ t1, . . . , nu represents the set of all agents. The set X˚ represents the set
of all coalitions of agents. We denote the X-Fold Cartesian product of R, by
RX . Every RX P RX defines a preference profile of the set of agents over the
set of lotteries.
The main representation of this section is about a specific form of aggregation
rules.
Definition 18. A group aggregation rule on X is a function f : X˚ Ñ R,
that associates with every coalition of agent A P X˚ a vN-M preference fpAq P
R.
Let f : X˚ Ñ R be a group aggregation rule and i P X. We interpret
fpiq as the preference of agent i. For every coalition A P X˚, we interpret
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the preference fpAq as the aggregated vN-M preference of the members of
coalition A. By considering remark 15, for every coalition A P X˚, we associate
the unique ray UA that represents the vN-M preference fpAq. Every cardinal
utility u P UA represents the vN-M preference fpAq.
An appealing property of group aggregation rules is that whenever two disjoint
coalitions, e.g. A,B P X˚, both prefer a lottery x to another lottery y, then
their union, A Y B, also prefers the lottery x to the lottery y. Formally, we
have:
Axiom 7. A group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R satisfies the extended
Pareto axiom if for all disjoint coalitions of agents A,B P X˚, and for all
lotteries x, y P L,
x fpAq y, x fpBq y ñ x fpAYBq y (3.1)
x fpAq y, x fpBq y ñ x fpAYBq y. (3.2)
The first condition, which we refer to as the extended weak Pareto axiom, states
that whenever two disjoint coalitions A,B P X˚ prefer lottery x to lottery y,
then the coalition formed as the union of A and B also prefers the lottery x to
the lottery y. The second condition states that if one of the coalitions strictly
prefers lottery x over lottery y, then the union of the coalition also strictly
prefers lottery x over lottery y.
Our last condition requires the existence of two lotteries in the set of lotteries,
in which all agents strictly prefers one over the other.
Definition 19. A group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R satisfies the minimal
agreement condition if there exist two lotteries x, x P L such that for every
agent i P X, x fpiqx.
Remark 16. Let a group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R satisfy both the min-
imal agreement and extended Pareto axiom. Given two agents i, j P X, by
applying the strict part of the definition of the extended Pareto axiom, we
have x fpti, juq x. Similarly, for every coalition of agents A P X˚, recursively
using the strict part of the extended Pareto axiom, we can show that x fpAq x.
Remark 17. There is another useful equivalent definition for the minimal agree-
ment condition. Let the vector v P Rm be x´x, where x, x are the two lotteries
in the definition of the minimal agreement condition. By considering remark
78
15, let a cardinal utility ui P Rm represent the vN-M preference fpiq. Hence,
x fpiq x if and only if ui ¨ v ą 0. Therefore, the definition of the minimal
agreement condition is equivalent to the existence of a direction v P Rm such
that for all i P X, ui ¨ v ą 0.
In the next section, first, we show that any group aggregation rule (under
the minimal agreement condition) satisfies the extended Pareto if and only
if it satisfies our strict weighted averaging axiom. Then, using the result
of Theorem 4, we characterize the representation of extended Pareto group
aggregation rules.
3.2.2 The Representation of Extended Pareto Group Aggregation
Rules
In this section, we assume that the group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R
satisfies the minimal agreement condition. In particular, we assume that all
agents strictly prefer the lottery x P L over the lottery x P L. By considering
remark 17, we define v “ x ´ x as the direction that every agent agrees on.
Following the comments right after the definition 18, for a coalition of agents
A P X˚, the ray UA represents the vN-M preference fpAq.
We define the space H by H “ tu P Rm| u¨v “ 1u. The space H represents the
normalization of utilities in which the difference of the value of utility of the
lottery x and the lottery x is exactly 1. For every coalitions of agents A P X˚
and for every cardinal utility uA P UA, by the minimal agreement condition
and remark 16, we have uA ¨ v ą 0. Therefore, for every coalition of agents
A P X˚, there is a unique cardinal utility uˆA P UA, such that uˆA is in H.
For the rest of the section, for every coalition A P X˚, we consider the unique
cardinal utility uˆA P H to represent the vN-M preference fpAq. Using this
representation, we can represent the group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R, by a
normalized group aggregation rule fH : X
˚ Ñ Rm, where fHpAq “ uˆA.
The role of fH is to “normalize” the cardinal utilities to be in H. In other
words, we represent each vN-M preference by a unique cardinal utility that
the difference of the utility between the lottery x and x is one.
Remark 18. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the lottery x in
the definition of the minimal agreement condition is just the lottery 0. In
that case, the space H is vN-M preferences with the value 0 for the lottery 0
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and the value 1 for the lottery x. The role of fH is to normalize the cardinal
utilities to get the value 0 for the lottery 0 and the value 1 for the lottery x.
The next proposition shows that under the representation of the vN-M pref-
erence fpAq by the uˆA, the extended Pareto axiom is equivalent to the strict
weighted averaging axiom. Formally, we have:
Theorem 8. Let a group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R satisfy the minimal
agreement condition with v P Rm as the direction on which all agents agree.
Then, the following are equivalent:
1. f satisfies the extended Pareto axiom.
2. fH satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom.
The idea behind the proof is as follows. Assume that A,B P X˚ are two disjoint
coalitions of agents. We select two utilities uA P UA and uB P UB. We assume
that uAYB represents the preference of the union of them, i.e., uAYB P UAYB.
First, an immediate application of Farkas’ Lemma shows that uAYB should be
in the relative interior of the cone generated by the vectors uA and uB. Then,
by intersecting the cone generated by uA, uB and the hyperplane H, we show
that uˆAYB P Conv˝ptuˆA, uˆBuq, which completes the proof.
Finally, using the result of Theorem 4, we immediately attain the representa-
tion of the extended Pareto group aggregation rules.
Corollary 8. Let a rich group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R satisfy both the
extended Pareto axiom and minimal agreement condition. Then, there exists a









Moreover, the weight function is unique up to multiplication by a positive num-
ber.
As shown in Example 11, the richness condition is crucial. The richness here
is equivalent to the existence of three non-collinear “normalized” cardinal util-
ities in the space H. Therefore, the richness in this case is equivalent to the
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existence of three linearly independent cardinal utilities in the range of the
aggregation rule.2
The representation above finds the unique cardinal utility associated with the
fpAq in the space H. Hence, we can interpret the theorem as a generalization
of the main theorem of Harsanyi (1955) on Utilitarianism. However, our result
shows the connection between weights of individuals in different sub-coalitions
of the main profile.
To see the connection with Harsanyi’s result, we rewrite the theorem in an
additive form: let the group aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ R satisfy both the
extended Pareto axiom and minimal agreement condition. Then, there exists
a weight function w : X Ñ R`` such that for every coalition of agents A P X˚,




Moreover, it is important that the representation is unique up to multiplica-
tion.
By defining upiq :“ wpiqfHpiq for i P X, we can rewrite equation 3.4 in a more
familiar additive form of: ÿ
iPA
upiq. (3.5)
Moreover, if we consider only the representations with the value 0 for the
lottery 0, this representation is “unique” up to multiplication by a positive
number.
There are two immediate applications of corollary 8. First, Section 3.2.3 shows
an application in characterizing the class of extended Pareto generalized social
welfare functions and relative utilitarianism. Then, Section 4.2 covers the
other application, or interpretation, by providing a simple theory of subjective
conditional expected utility of state-dependant preferences.
3.2.3 The Representation of Extended Pareto Generalized Social
Welfare Functions
In this section, by using corollary 8, we provide the characterization of the
class of extended Pareto generalized social welfare functions. The represen-
2This is similar to the argument of remark 13.
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tation is a generalization of corollary 8, in which, unlike the previous model,
each individual can get any vN-M preference relation. The standard domain
of a social welfare function is a set of fixed-length profiles of individuals, where
each individual has all possible preference ordering. However, the domain of
our generalized social welfare function is the set of all different groups (with
all different lengths) of individuals, where each individual has all possible pref-
erence orderings.
The setup is the same as the one in the previous section. However, in order
to define the domain of generalized social welfare functions, we need some
definitions. Without loss of generality, we assume that the lottery x P L, in
the definition of the minimal agreement, is the vector 0. Let x P L be any
lottery other than 0. Define Rx Ă R as the set of all vN-M preferences that
strictly prefer x to 0. Let RXx be the X-fold Cartesian product of Rx. Every
R P RXx defines a preference profile of the set of individuals. For any coalition
A P X˚ and for any preference profile R P RXx , let RA P RAx denote the
restriction of the profile R to the coalition A.
Based on remark 15, we can represent each preference R P R by a unique
ray UR “ tαu| α ą 0u, where u P Rm is a cardinal utility representing R.
Moreover, for any preference R P Rx, there should be a unique cardinal utility
uR P UR with uR ¨ x “ 1. Denote H “ tu P Rm| u.x “ 1u as the space of
all cardinal utilities attaining value 0 at the lottery 0 and the value 1 at the
lottery x. Let the function uH : Rx Ñ H associate each preference R P Rx
with the unique cardinal utility uHpRq P H that represents it. This function is
a bijection associating each preference to the unique cardinal utility attaining
value 0 at the lottery 0 and value 1 at the lottery x.
We denote RX Ă RXx as the set of all profiles where the representation
of individuals’ cardinal utilities in the space H is not a subset of a single
line. Formally, we define RX “ tR P RXx | dptuHpRiq| i P Xuq ą 1u, where
dptuHpRiq| i P Xuq is the dimension of the smallest linear variety containing
all uHpRiq, i P X.3
Finally, we denote RX˚ “ tR P RAx | A Ď X,R P RXu as all the profiles in RX
and all sub-coalitions of those profiles. RX˚ is the domain of our generalized
social welfare functions. Formally, we have:
3There should be at least four alternatives; otherwise, RX is the empty set.
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Definition 20. A generalized social welfare function on RX is a func-
tion f : RX˚ Ñ R, that associates with any coalition A P X and any profile
R P RXx a preference fpRAq P R. Moreover, we assume that for any individual
i P X, and any profile R P RXx , fpRiq “ Ri.
In our setup, the domain of generalized social welfare functions is a rich set
of all sizes of profiles. Moreover, it satisfies the Individualism axiom, which
means that it associates any individual preference to the same preference.
The connection between profiles of different sizes is the extended Pareto
axiom . The extended Pareto states that if the associated preference ordering
of two disjoint coalitions of individuals, A and B, each prefer a lottery x to y,
then the associated preference ordering of the union of the coalition with the
same preference as before should also prefer x to y.
Definition 21. A generalized social welfare function f : RX˚ Ñ R satisfies
the extended Pareto axiom if for every preference profile R P RX and for
any two disjoint coalitions A,B P X˚, and for all lotteries x, y P L,
x fpRAq y, x fpRBq y ñ x fpRAYBq y (3.6)
x fpRAq y, x fpRBq y ñ x fpRAYBq y. (3.7)
Our main result of this section characterizes the class of extended Pareto
generalized social welfare functions.
Theorem 9. Let X be a set of individuals with |X| ě 4. The generalized
social welfare function f : RX˚ Ñ R satisfies the extended Pareto axiom if and
only if there exists a weight function w : X ˆ Rx Ñ R``, such that for any










Moreover, the weight function is unique up to multiplication by a positive num-
ber.
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Note that the representation above finds the unique cardinal utility in the
space H, which is associated with the aggregated preference relation fpRAq.
In other words, it normalizes the aggregated utility representation of fpRAq
to have the value 0 at the lottery 0 and value 1 at the lottery x.
Remark 19. We can rewrite the theorem to specify that the generalized social
welfare function f : RX˚ Ñ R satisfies the extended Pareto axiom if and
only if there exists a weight function w : X ˆRx Ñ R``, such that for any





It is important that each weight depends only on the associated individual’s
preferences and not on the other individuals.
Note that, based on corollary 8, for any fixed profile R P RX , there exists a
weight function (depending on the whole profile R and each individual index)
satisfying equation 3.4. However, in equation 3.9, the weight function depends
only on each individual’s own preference and not the whole profile. The reason
the theorem works is the structure we put on the domain, RX˚ , in the defini-
tion of generalized social welfare functions. The proof of the result is in the
Appendix.
The weight function in the representation depends on each individual’s index.
However, adding the classical Anonymity axiom makes the weight function
independent of individual’s indexes.
Axiom 8. An extended Pareto aggregation rule f : RX˚ Ñ R satisfies the
Anonymity axiom, if any permutation of the indexes of individuals does not
change the generalized social welfare function.
The anonymity axiom makes any extended Pareto generalized social welfare
functions independent of the individual’s indexes. Hence, the uniqueness of
the weight function in Theorem 9 makes the weight function, associated with
an anonymous extended Pareto aggregation rule, independent of the indexes.
Therefore, we have:
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Corollary 9. Let X be a set of individuals with |X| ě 5. The extended Pareto
generalized social welfare function f : RX˚ Ñ R satisfies the Anonymity axiom
if and only if there exists a weight function w : Rx Ñ R``, such that for any














Moreover, the weight function is unique up to multiplication by a positive num-
ber.
The representation above is the main result of this section. It is important
to point out the positive nature of our result, given the claims by Kalai and
N. Schmeidler (1977) and Hylland (1980) that the negative conclusion of the
impossibility theorem by Arrow (1963) holds even with vN-M preferences.
However, other than the differences between our model and theirs, we only
consider the restricted domain where all preferences prefer the lottery x over
the lottery x. As discussed before, the definition of our restricted domain is
crucial in corollary 9.
Remark 20. Adding different other axioms can restrict choices of the weight
function. For example, relative utilitarianism can be obtained by adding the
weak IIA axiom of the paper by Dhillon (1998). By adding the weak IIA, the
weight function normalizes each preference such that the difference between
the cardinal utility of the best alternative and the worst alternative becomes 1.






In the context of social choice, Dhillon (1998) and Baucells et al. (2008) study
variants of extended Pareto rules.
Baucells et al. (2008) study the extended Pareto rule over vN-M preferences
by relaxing the completeness axiom. Besides the technical and conceptual
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differences between the two approaches and results, their model depends on
their non-degeneracy condition. The condition is only satisfied when there is a
spanning tree over the preferences, and every three consecutive preferences in
the spanning tree are linearly independent. However, the richness condition of
our theorem only requires three linearly independent vectors among the whole
set of preferences. Moreover, our result can be applied even for the class of
extended weak Pareto aggregation rules, under our strong richness condition.
Note that our primary goal in this paper is to show that extended Pareto
and extended weak Pareto are special cases of our weighted averaging axiom
(under the minimal agreement condition).
The papers by Dhillon (1998), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), and Borgers et
al. (2017b) each by considering different sets of axioms, other than Arrow’s,
provide an axiomatization of relative utilitarianism as a positive result. The
paper by Dhillon (1998) is the closest one to ours. Dhillon considers a variant
of extended Pareto to get a weighted averaging structure. However, Borgers
et al. (2017a) show a counterexample to the representation. We restrict the
domain and use our definition of extended Pareto to get the weighted averag-
ing structure as a consequence of our main theorem on the representation of
weighted averaging aggregation rules. Finally, the technique we developed can
also be used to provide a representation of the extended weak Pareto social
welfare functions.
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C h a p t e r 4
A SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONAL EXPECTED UTILITY
THEORY OF STATE-DEPENDENT PREFERENCES
4.1 Introduction
The choice-theoretic foundation of subjective expected utility was developed
by the seminal works of Ramsey (1931), Savage (1954), and Anscombe and
Aumann (1963). In the standard model, the decision maker has a ranking
over acts (state-contingent outcomes). The representation of this ranking con-
sists of a subjective probability over the set of states, capturing the decision
maker’s beliefs, and a cardinal utility representing the decision maker’s tastes
over the set of outcomes, independent of the realization of the true state. How-
ever, in many applications, such as models for buying health insurance, the
independence of the utility and the set of states is not a plausible assumption1.
In Section 4.2, we provide a simple theory of subjective expected utility of
state-dependent utility by reinterpreting our representation of extended Pareto
aggregation rules. We build our model using the framework of Anscombe et al.
(1963). In our model, the decision maker has a preference ordering over the
set of conditional constant acts. This means that given any fixed event, the
decision maker has a hypothetical conditional preference ordering over the set
of lotteries, representing her conditional preference condition on learning that
only that event is happening2. Each of these hypothetical conditional prefer-
ences satisfies the axioms of Von-Neumann et al. (1944), which means each
has an affine representation. We show that as long as the class of hypothetical
conditional preferences satisfies the extended Pareto axiom, there is a subjec-
tive probability measure over the set of states and a state-dependent utility
over the set of alternatives. The class of hypothetical conditional preferences
has a representation in the form of conditional expectation with respect to the
subjective probability and the state-dependent utility.
The result shows that the extended Pareto is the main force behind the sepa-
ration of the belief and the state-dependent utility. However, the representa-
1Check Arrow (1974), Cook and Graham (1997), and Karni (1985) for more discussions.
2In Section 4.2, we illustrate another interpretation of hypothetical conditional prefer-
ences by providing a preference ordering over the set of conditional constant acts.
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tion is not unique. Hence, the challenge is to provide meaning to a decision
maker’s prior beliefs, when utility is state-dependent. We get the uniqueness
by adding a stronger version of our minimal agreement condition. The strong
minimal agreement condition specifies that there exist two lotteries where one
is strictly preferred to the other, regardless of states. Moreover, the decision
maker’s conditional preference for each of them is independent of the set of
states.
We show that under the strong minimal agreement, the belief is unique. More-
over, the state-dependent utility is unique up to affine transformation.
4.2 Main Model and Results
4.2.1 Primitives
In this section, we develop a simple theory of subjective expected utility of
state-dependant utility by reinterpreting the results of sections 3.2.2 and 2.5.3.
We show that the extended Pareto is the main force behind the separation of
a subjective belief and a state-dependant utility. However, adding a stronger
version of our minimal agreement condition allows us to uniquely separate the
belief and the state-dependant utility.
Our model is built using the framework of Anscombe et al. (1963). Let Ω “
t1, 2, . . . , nu be a finite set of states of nature. The finite set M represents
outcomes. The simplex L “ ∆pMq represents the set of lotteries over the set
M . A lottery l P L associates the probability li to the outcome i PM .
In this model, the decision maker faces two levels of uncertainty. First, the de-
cision maker does not know which states will obtain. Second, after realization
of the state, she faces the distribution induced by the lottery over outcomes.
There is a single outcome O other than the outcomes of the set M . The
outcome O represents that the decision maker can ex-ante refuse any lottery.
In our setup, the objects of choice are conditional constant acts. For any
lottery l P L, and any event A P 2ΩzH, the function f : Ω Ñ L Y tOu such
that fpwq “ l for ω P A and fpwq “ O for ω P Ac is termed a conditional
constant act and denoted by f “ pl, A,O,Acq. The interpretation is that if
event A is realized, the decision maker faces the lottery l. Otherwise, O will
be realized. We assume that the decision maker has a preference relation ě,
and not necessarily a complete relation, over the set of conditional constant
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acts.
Let F “ tpl, A,O,Acq| H ‰ A P 2Ω, l P Lu represent the set of conditional
constant acts. For any event H ‰ A P 2Ω, let FA “ tpl, A,O,Acq|l P Lu be
the set of all conditional constant acts attaining a lottery on the event A and
staying out on the event Ac. We represent the conditional preference ordering
of the decision maker over FA by ěA. For any two lotteries l1, l2, we write
l1 ěA l2 as a shorthand of pl1, A,O,Acq ě pl2, A,O,Acq.
Our interpretation of conditional preference ordering is related to the mod-
els developed by Luce and Krantz (1971), Fishburn (1973), Skiadas (1997a),
and Karni and D. Schmeidler (2007). However, there is another interpreta-
tion of the conditional preference similar to the conditional decision model of
Ghirardato (2002). In this interpretation, we assume that the decision maker
may receive some information that only ω P A can be realized. In this case,
ěA represents the decision maker’s ex-post preference over the set of lotteries.
Similarly, ěΩ represents her ex-ante preference over exactly the same set of
lotteries.
Regardless of the interpretation, the goal is to provide a theory that connects
the class of conditional preferences through the Bayes updating. Formally, our
goal is to find the condition that there exists a state-dependent utility function
u : ΩˆM Ñ R and a subjective probability measure P : Ω Ñ R``, such that
for every two lotteries x, y P L, and any event A the following holds:
x ěA y ô
ÿ
ωPA
P pω|AqExrupω, ¨qs ě
ÿ
ωPA
P pω|AqEyrupω, ¨qs. (4.1)
In the equation above, Exrupw, ¨qs represents the expected utility of the state-
dependent utility u in the state ω and with respect to the lottery x. The right
hand side of the equation is comparing the conditional expectation utility of
the lottery x and y, with respect to the subjective probability measure P
and the state-dependent utility u. The importance of the result is that the
probability measure P depends on the event A through the Bayes rule.
4.2.2 Main Axioms and Representation
In order to get equation 4.1, we define the following axioms.
Axiom 4.2.1. (Weak Order) For any event A, the conditional preference
ěA is complete and transitive.
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Axiom 4.2.2. (vN-M Continuity) For any event A and for every x, y, z P
L, if x ěA y ěA z, there exist α, β P p0, 1q such that
αx` p1´ αqz ěA y ěA βx` p1´ βqz.
Axiom 4.2.3. (Independence) For any event A, every x, y, z P L, and every
α P p0, 1q,
x ěA y ñ αx` p1´ αqz ěA αy ` p1´ αqz.
The first three axioms are the standard vN-M axioms. Together, they imply
that there is a representation of each conditional preference ěA in the form of
an affine utility function. However, the affine utility function in the represen-
tation depends on the event A. The next axiom is the main connection of the
class of conditional preferences.
Axiom 4.2.4. (extended Pareto) For any two disjoint events A,B, and for
every x, y P L,
x ěA y, x ěB y ñ x ěAYB y (4.2)
x ąA y, x ěB y ñ x ąAYB y (4.3)
This is the main axiom of the previous section. The role is the same as
before, to get the Bayesian form of aggregation. Theorem 8 connects the ex-
tended Pareto (extended weak Pareto) to the strict weighted averaging axiom
(weighted averaging axiom).
We add two more axioms, similar to the richness and minimal agreement
conditions of Section 3.2.
Axiom 4.2.5. (Minimal Agreement) There exist two lotteries, x, x P L,
such that for every ω P Ω, x ąω x.
In the axiom, the two lotteries x, x are not necessarily the best and worst
lotteries. The decision maker, regardless of the realization of the states, always
prefers the lottery x to the lottery x.
The last axiom is the richness condition of Section 2.3.
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Axiom 4.2.6. (Richness) There exist three states ω1, ω2, ω3 P Ω such that
for any ω P tω1, ω2, ω3u, there exist two lotteries, x, y P L, where x ąω y and
y ěω1 x for ω1 P tω1, ω2, ω3uztωu.
The role of the axiom is similar to the role of the richness condition in Section
2.3. The axiom implies that there exists a representation of the class of con-
ditional preferences with affine functions having a dimension of greater than
two. It is another way of forcing the conditional preferences to satisfy the
definition of the RX in Section 3.2.3.
By considering these six axioms, we can rationalize the behavior of the deci-
sion maker as a subjective expected utility maximizer with a state-dependent
utility.
Theorem 10. Suppose that the decision maker’s conditional preferences sat-
isfy axioms 6.1-6.6, then there exist a function u : ΩˆM Ñ R and a probability
measure P : Ω Ñ R``, such that for every two lotteries x, y P L, and any event
A, the following holds:
x ěA y ô
ÿ
ωPA
P pω|AqExrupω, ¨qs ě
ÿ
ωPA
P pω|AqEyrupω, ¨qs. (4.4)
The proof is similar to the proof of corollary 8.
It is important to note that the probability measure P is not unique. Let
Q : Ω Ñ R`` be any probability measure on Ω; by defining a state-dependent
utility wpω, xq “ upω,xq
Qpωq , equation 4.4 continues to hold with Q and w. However,
if we change the minimal agreement axiom to a stronger version, we attain the
uniqueness. In the stronger version of the minimal agreement, we assume that
the decision maker’s preferences over the lotteries x, x is indifferent to the
realization of the states. Formally:
Axiom 4.2.7. (Strong Minimal Agreement) There exist two lotteries
x, x P L such that for every ω P Ω, x ąω x. Moreover, px, tω1u, O,Ωztω1uq „
px, tω2u, O,Ωztω2u) and px, tω1u, O,Ωztω1uq „ px, tω2u, O,Ωztω2uq for all
ω1, ω2 P Ω.
Conceptually, this axiom is closely related to A.0 axiom by Karni and D.
Schmeidler (2007). However, unlike Karni’s axiom, we do not need these two
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lotteries to be the best and worst lotteries in the set of lotteries. Our model
only needs two lotteries with one strictly preferred to the other, regardless of
states. Moreover, the decision maker’s conditional preference for each of them
is independent of the set of states.
By replacing the minimal agreement axiom with the strong minimal agree-
ment axiom, we can “uniquely” separate the belief from the state-dependent
preference.
Theorem 11. Suppose that the decision maker’s conditional preferences sat-
isfy axioms 6.1-6.7, then there exist a function u : ΩˆM Ñ R and a probability
measure P : Ω Ñ R``, such that for every two lotteries x, y P L, and every
event A, the following holds:
x ěA y ô
ÿ
ωPA
P pω|AqExrupω, ¨qs ě
ÿ
ωPA
P pω|AqEyrupω, ¨qs. (4.5)
Moreover, the probability measure P is unique and the function u is unique up
to affine transformations.
Proof. Based on Theorem 10, there exists a pair pP, uq satisfying equation 4.5.
To prove the uniqueness, we assume that pP1, u1q and pP2, u2q both represent
the same class of conditional preferences. By considering the conditional pref-
erence ěω and the vN-M Theorem, we know that u2pω, .q “ αωu1pω, .q ` βω.
By using the strong minimal agreement axiom, we have u1pω1, xq “ u1pω2, xq,
u2pω1, xq “ u2pω2, xq, u1pω1, xq “ u1pω2, xq, and u2pω1, xq “ u2pω2, xq for any
two states ω1, ω2 P Ω. Therefore, αω1 “ αω2 and βω1 “ βω2 for all ω1, ω2 P Ω.
Hence, u2pω, .q “ αu1pω, .q ` β for all ω P Ω.
We consider an event A. Both pP1, u1q and pP2, u2q represent the con-




P2pω|AqEp.qru2pω, .qs “ ř
ωPA




P2pω|AqEp.qru1pω, .qs ` β.
Since, α is strictly positive, the last representation is the same asř
ωPA











P1pω|AqEp.qru1pω, .qs both represent the conditional preference ěA.
Using the richness axiom, strong minimal agreement condition, and uniqueness
of corollary 8, we have P1 “ P2. This completes the proof.
The result shows that adding the strong minimal agreement allows us to
uniquely define the belief and the state-dependent utility.
4.3 Related Literature
There are many papers and different approaches to address the shortcomings
of subjective expected utility theory. Note that our goal, in this context, is to
explain the basic underlying structure that let us separate beliefs and state-
dependent utilities.
Karni, D. Schmeidler, and Vind (1983) and Karni and D. Schmeidler (2016) use
hypothetical preferences on hypothetical lotteries to obtain the identification
of the beliefs and state-dependent preferences. Dereze (1987), Dereze and
Rustichini (1999), and Karni (2006) present different theories to identify state-
dependent preferences in situations where moral hazard is present.
Luce and Krantz (1971) and Fishburn (1973) use preferences on enlarged choice
space of all conditional acts to model subjective expected utility of state-
dependent preferences. However, our paper only considers the hypothetical
conditional preferences on the set of conditional “constant” acts. We find the
necessary and sufficient condition that our conditional preferences are related
to each other through a subjective probability and a state-dependent utility.
The papers by Skiadas (1997a), Ghirardato (2002), and Karni and D. Schmei-
dler (2007) are closely (conceptually) related to our main result of Section 4.2.
However, there are many differences between each result. Moreover, our goal is
to build the model that only extended Pareto derives the separation of beliefs
and state-dependent preferences.
Skiadas (1997a) presents a nonexpected utility model, by considering hypo-
thetical preferences over the set of act-event pairs. His coherence axiom has
the same role as the extended Pareto axiom in our setup. However, he used
the solvability axiom to be able to apply the Debreu’s additive representation
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theorem. In our paper, we consider the class of conditional vN-M preferences.
As a result, we only require the extended Pareto for our representation.
Karni and D. Schmeidler (2007) presents a general model with a preference
ordering over the set of unconditional acts. Using the preference order, he
defines the set of conditional preferences over the set of all conditional acts.
Therefore, to connect the class of conditional preferences, the model needs the
existence of the constant-valuation acts. Moreover, the cardinal and ordinal
coherence axioms are the main forces behind obtaining the Bayesian updating
in his representation. However, in our more restricted domain, we only need
the extended Pareto to get our representation.
Finally, Ghirardato (2002), by replacing Savage’s sure thing principle by dy-
namic consistency, obtains a subjective expected utility theory that the con-
ditional preferences are connected through the Bayes rule. However, his rep-
resentation only holds for the state-independent preferences.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Mo¨bius Operator
The main technical tool for section 1.5 is the Mo¨bius inversion formula 1.
Let pX,Áq be a finite partial ordered set. We define the Mo¨bius function
µ : X ˆX Ñ R as follows:
We set µpx, yq “ 0 whenever y Ã x, and µpx, xq “ 1 for all x P X. Then, we
define other values inductively as follows:








$&%1 if x “ y,0 otherwise.
Let pXqR denote the set of all functions from X to R. Then, the Mo¨bius
operator Φ : pXqR Ñ pXqR is defined by Φpfqpxq “ řxÁy fpyq. Mo¨bius
inversion formula guarantees that the Mo¨bius operator is bijective and the
inverse is Φ´1pgqpxq “ řxÁy µpx, yqgpyq.
Theorem 12. (Mo¨bius inversion formula) Let pX,Áq be a finite partial or-










1For an application of the technique in Kreps’ setting, check Nehring (2001). For a
complete study of the concept, see Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1989).
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µpy, xq˘fpzq “ fpxq.
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A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
The following two lemmas are the central ideas behind the proof. They help
us to first define the function w and then extend it from the binary sets to any
finite-cardinality sets.
Lemma 5. Select X as any nonempty set. Let X˚ denote the set of all
nonempty finite subsets of X. Consider two functions f1, f2 : X
˚ Ñ Rn that
satisfy the strict weighted averaging axiom. Select four points a, b, c, d in the
space X˚ such that a Y b “ c Y d and a X b “ c X d “ H. If @ x P
ta, b, c, du f1pxq “ f2pxq and not all tf1paq, f1pbq, f1pcq, f1pdqu are on a same
line, then f1paY bq “ f2paY bq.
Proof. Since f1 satisfies the strict weighted averaging axiom and aY b “ cY d
and a X b “ c X d “ H, thus f1pa Y bq is on the line connecting f1paq, f1pbq.
Also, since aYb “ cYd , f1paYbq “ f1pcYdq should be on the line connecting
f1pcq and f1pdq. But tf1paq, f1pbq, f1pcq, f1pdqu are not collinear, thus the line
connecting f1paq and f1pbq and the line connecting f1pcq and f1pdq can only
intersect at most at a single point. But f1pa Y bq is on the both lines, hence
this point must be the unique intersection of them.
Similarly, the same is true for f2. This means f2pa Y bq must be the unique
intersection of the line passing through f2paq, f2pbq and the line passing through
f2pcq, f2pdq. But since @x P ta, b, c, du f1pxq “ f2pxq, f2pa Y bq should be
the unique intersection of the line passing through f1paq, f1pbq and the line
passing through f1pcq, f1pdq. But we have already shown that f1paY bq is also
the unique intersection of the line passing through f1paq, f1pbq and the line
passing through f1pcq, f1pdq. Thus, f1paY bq “ f2paY bq.
Lemma 6. Assume that tx, y, zu are three points in X such that
fpxq, fpyq, fpzq are not collinear. Let f satisfy the strict weighted averag-
ing axiom and fptx, y, zuq “ a1fpxq ` a2fpyq ` a3fpzq, then a1{a2 must be
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independent of the choice of z, as long as fpxq, fpyq, fpzq are not collinear.




Proof. Since fpxq, fpyq, fpzq are not collinear, they should be affinely indepen-
dent. Hence, a1, a2, a3 are uniquely defined.
By the strict weighted averaging axiom, there exists λ1 P p0, 1q such that
fptx, y, zuq “ λ1fptx, yuq ` p1´ λ1qfptzuq. Again by the strict weighted aver-
aging axiom there exists λ P p0, 1q such that fptx, yuq “ λfpxq ` p1´ λqfpyq.
Hence, fptx, y, zuq “ λ1pλfpxq ` p1 ´ λqfpyqq ` p1 ´ λ1qfptzuq. By affinely
independence of fpxq, fpyq, fpzq, we should have a1 “ λ1λ and a2 “ λ1p1´λq.
This means that a1
a2
“ λ
1´λ , which means that a1{a2 is independent of the choice
of z, as long as fpxq, fpyq, fpzq are not collinear.
B.1.1 Proving the necessary and the uniqueness part
























xPAYB wpxq , we have fpA Y Bq “ λfpAq ` p1 ´ λqfpBq. Thus, the
strict weighted averaging axiom satisfied.







xPA w2pxq . Since the range of f is not a subset of a
line, there exist at least three elements x, y, z P X such that fpxq, fpyq, fpzq
are not collinear. Thus, they are affinely independent. Hence, fptx, y, zuq “
a1fpxq ` a2fpyq ` a3fpzq has a unique solution a1, a2, a3. Hence, there should
be an α such that w1ppq{w2ppq “ α @p P tx, y, zu. We will show that for all
other point r P X, w1prq{w2prq “ α.
Select a point r P X, based on the assumption on tx, y, zu, there should be at
least two points u, v in tx, y, zu such that fprq, fpuq, fpvq are not collinear.
Without loss of generality, assume that tu, vu “ tx, yu. Since fprq, fpxq, fpyq
are affinely independent, fptx, y, ruq “ b1fpxq` b2fpyq` b3fprq where b1, b2, b3
are unique. Therefore, there exists β such that w1ppq{w2ppq “ β @p P tx, y, ru.
But notice that α “ w1pxq{w2pxq “ β. Hence, we should have w1prq{w2prq “ α
and this is what we wanted to prove.
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B.1.2 Proving the sufficiency part
First, in order to define the function w, fix an element x0 P X and put wpx0q “
1. Based on the strict weighted averaging axiom for any y P Xztx0u such that
fpyq ‰ fpx0q, we have a unique λ P p0, 1q such that fptx0, yuq “ λfpx0q` p1´
λqfpyq. Let define wpyq “ 1´λ
λ
.
To define the weight for any other y P Xztx0u with fpyq “ fpx0q, we fix
another point z0 P Xztx0u such that fpz0q ‰ fpx0q. Since fpx0q “ fpyq,
we should have fpyq ‰ fpz0q. By using the strict weighted averag-
ing axiom, we know that there exists a unique λ P p0, 1q such that
fptz0, yuq “ λfpz0q ` p1 ´ λqfpyq. Since the weight on z0 has already
been defined, we define the weight of y such that wpyq
wpz0q “ 1´λλ . Thus,
wpyq “ wpz0q ˆ 1´λλ .
In the rest of this section, we are going to prove that w satisfies the repre-
sentation of the theorem. It means that by defining f˚pAq “
ř
xPA wpxqfpxqř
xPA wpxq , we
should have f˚pAq “ fpAq.
First, in Step 1 we prove that the representation holds for any three points,
as long as the three points under f are not collinear. In Step 2, we prove
that the representation holds for any two points. In Step 3, (which is not
necessary, and we provide it for its simplicity to capture the main ideas of the
main part) we prove that for three points the representation holds. Finally,
in Step 4, by using induction on the cardinality of subsets of X, we show that
the representation holds for any subset of X.
Step 1: for any three points r, s, t such that fprq, fpsq, fptq are not collinear,
we have fptr, s, tuq “ a1fprq`a2fpsq`a3fptq, where ai are unique. Note that
it is enough to prove that a1
a2
“ wprq








wprq . There are two cases:
Case 1: If x0, r, s are such fpx0q, fprq, fpsq are not collinear then






















Case 2: If x0, r, s are such that fpx0q, fprq, fpsq are collinear, in this case
both tfpx0q, fprq, fptqu and tfpx0q, fpsq, fptqu are not collinear. By the same
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wptqˆ wptqwpsq “ wprqwpsq , which is what we wanted to prove.
Step 2: Assume that r, s P X. We want to show that f˚ptr, suq “ fptr, suq.
If fprq “ fpsq, then it is true. If fprq ‰ fpsq, then by the richness condition,
there exists an element t P X such that tfptq, fprq, fpsqu are not collinear.
Based on Step 1, we know that fptt, r, suq “ f˚ptt, r, suq, also we have
fptq “ f˚ptq, fprq “ f˚prq, and fpsq “ f˚psq. Notice that, based on the
strict weighted averaging axiom, fptr, suq is on the line connecting fprq and
fpsq. Also, it is on the line connecting fptt, r, suq and fptq. The reason
is that by the strict combination axiom, there exist a λ P p0, 1q such that
fptt, r, suq “ λfptq ` p1 ´ λqfptr, suq, which means that fptr, suq is on the
line connecting fptt, r, suq and fptq. Similarly, everything holds for f˚ which
means that f˚ptr, suq is on the line connecting f˚prq and f˚psq and also it
is on the line connecting f˚ptt, r, suq and f˚ptq. Since tfptq, fprq, fpsqu are
not collinear the intersection of two line can have at most one solution and
since fptt, r, suq “ f˚ptt, r, suq, fptq “ f˚ptq, fprq “ f˚prq, and fpsq “ f˚psq
then by a similar argument as Lemma 5, we should have a unique inter-
section, which satisfies f˚ptr, suq “ fptr, suq. This is what we wanted to prove.
Step 3: (This part is the tricky part, and we provide it to capture the
main ideas. We will use the same technique in Step 4) We are going to prove
that for all three point r, s, t we have f˚ptr, s, tuq “ fptr, s, tuq.There are two
separate cases to be considered.
Case 1: If fprq, fpsq, fptq are not collinear, then by Step 1, it is correct.
Case 2: Assume that fprq, fpsq, fptq are collinear. If all of them are the same,
then by strict weighted averaging axiom f˚ptr, s, tuq “ fptr, s, tuq. Hence,
assume that they are not all the same.
Without loss of the generality, assume that fpsq ‰ fprq, fpsq ‰ fptq. Based
on the richness condition of f , we should have a point v P X such that not
all fpvq, fprq, fpsq, and fptq are collinear. Note that, fpvq, fprq, fpsq are not
collinear. Similarly, fpvq, fpsq, fptq are not collinear. Based on Case 1, we
know that f˚ptv, r, suq “ fptv, r, suq and f˚ptv, s, tuq “ fptv, s, tuq. Also,
we know that f˚pvq “ fpvq, f˚prq “ fprq, f˚psq “ fpsq, and f˚ptq “ fptq.
Using the strict weighted averaging axiom, we know that fptv, r, s, tuq is on
104
the intersection of the line passing through fptv, r, suq and fptq, and the line
passing through the fptv, s, tuq and fprq. Also, note that not all of fptv, r, suq,
fptv, s, tuq, fprq, and fptq are collinear, since otherwise fpvq must be on the
line connecting fprq and fpsq. Similarly, we have the same properties for
f˚ptv, r, s, tuq. Based on the argument of the Lemma 5, we have fptv, r, s, tuq “
f˚ptv, r, s, tuq.
By using the strict weighted averaging axiom, we know that fptr, s, tuq is on
the line passing through fptv, r, s, tuq and fpvq, since there exists λ P p0, 1q
such that fptv, r, s, tuq “ λfptr, s, tuq ` p1 ´ λqfpvq. Again, by using the
strict weighted averaging axiom, we know that fptr, s, tuq is on the line
passing through fptr, suq and fptq. Also, the same holds for f˚. Moreover,
we have fptv, r, s, tuq “ f˚ptv, r, s, tuq, fptr, suq “ f˚ptr, suq, fpvq “ f˚pvq,
and fptq “ f˚ptq. Also, not all fptv, r, s, tuq, fptr, suq, fpvq, and fptq are on
a same line, since otherwise fpvq, fprq, fpsq, and fptq are collinear which
is not correct. As a result, based on the argument of lemma 5, we have
f˚ptr, s, tuq “ fptr, s, tuq. The latter is what we wanted to prove.
Step 4 (The main Step): Up to here, we prove that for any A P X˚ if
|A| ď 3 then f˚pAq “ fpAq. To complete the proof, we will use an induction
on the cardinality of A. Assume that for all A P X˚ with |A| ď k we have
f˚pAq “ fpAq. We are going to show that for all A P X˚ with |A| “ k ` 1,
we have f˚pAq “ fpAq.
Fix a subset A with |A| “ k ` 1. Assume that A “ tx1, . . . , xk`1u. There are
two separate cases to be considered.
Case 1: Assume that not all tfpxiquk`1i“1 are collinear. Note that, by the
induction hypothesis, @x P A and @ B P 2Aztxu we have fpBq “ f˚pBq. Define
linepfpxq, fpAztxuqq as the line passing through fpxq and fpAztxuq for the
case where fpxq ­“ fpAztxuq. However, if fpxq “ fpAztxuq, then define it as
the single point fpxq.
If there exists x P A such that fpxq “ fpAztxuq, then based on the strict
weighted averaging axiom , there exists λ P p0, 1q such that fpAq “ λfpxq `
p1 ´ λqfpAztxuq “ fpxq. Similarly, f˚pAq “ f˚pxq. But, we know that
fpxq “ f˚pxq, which means that fpAq “ f˚pAq.
If @ x P A fpxq ­“ fpAztxuq, then there exist x, y P A such that
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fpxq, fpAztxuq, fpyq, fpAztyuq are not collinear. Beacuse otherwise all fpxiq
are on the fpxq, fpAztxuq, which cannot be correct since we assumed
that not all tfpxiquk`1i“1 are collinear. Considering x, y P A such that
fpxq, fpAztxuq, fpyq, fppAztyuq are not collinear, based on the strict weighted
averaging axiom we know that fpAq is on linepfpxq, fpAztxuqq. Also, it must
be on linepfpyq, fpAztyuqq. Similarly, by the strict weighted averaging ax-
iom when applied to f˚, we know that f˚pAq is on linepf˚pxq, f˚pAztxuqq.
Moreover, it must be on the linepf˚pyq, f˚pAztyuqq.
Since (1) fpxq “ f˚pxq, fpAztxuq “ f˚pAztxuq, P pyq “ P ˚pyq,
P pAztyuq “ P ˚pAztyuq and, (2) not all fpxq, fpAztxuq, fpyq, and fppAztyuq
are collinear, based on the Lemma 5, we have f˚pAq “ fpAq. Hence in the
case that not all tfpxiquk`1i“1 are collinear, we showed that f˚pAq “ fpAq.
Case 2: Assume that tfpxiquk`1i“1 are collinear. Without loss of generality,
assume that fpx1q, fpxk`1q are the two extreme points on the line that contains
them, which means that all other points are between these two.
If fpx1q “ fpxk`1q,then all tfpxiquk`1i“1 are the same. Using the strict weighted
averaging axiom, it shows that fpAq “ fpx1q “ f˚px1q “ f˚pAq.
If fpx1q ‰ fpxk`1q, based on the richness condition of the aggregation
rule f , we can select a point y P XzA such that not all fpyq, fpx1q,
and fpxk`1q are collinear. Based on the previous Case 1, we know that
fpy, x1, . . . , xkq “ f˚py, x1, . . . , xkq, since we have proved that f and f˚ are
coincided for any k ` 1 not collinear points. Similarly, we have fpy, x2,
. . . , xk`1q “ f˚py, x2, . . . , xk`1q.
Using the strict weighted averaging axiom, fpty, x1, . . . , xk`1uq is on the
linepfpty, x1, . . . , xkuq, fpxk`1qq. It is also on the linepfpty, x2,
. . . , xk`1uq, fpx1qq. Also, not all fpty, x1, . . . , xkuq, fpxk`1qq, fpty, x2,
. . . , xk`1uq, fpx1qq are collinear, since fpty, x1, . . . , xkuq cannot be on
linepfpx1q, fpxk`1qq otherwise fpyq must be on that line which is not correct.
Similarly, everything holds for the f˚.
Since, fpty, x1, . . . , xkuq “ f˚pty, x1, . . . , xkuq, fpxk`1q “ f˚pxk`1q,
fpty, x2, . . . , xk`1uq “ f˚pty, x2, . . . , xk`1uq, and fpx1q “ f˚px1q then again
by using Lemma 5, we get fpty, x1, . . . , xk`1uq “ f˚pty, x1, . . . , xk`1uq.
The point fptx1, . . . , xk`1uq is on the linepfpx1q, fpxkqq. It is also on the
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linepfpyq, fpty, x1, . . . , xk`1uqq, since by the strict weighted averaging axiom
fpty, x1, . . . , xk`1uq “ λfpyq ` p1 ´ λqfptx1, . . . , xk`1uq for some λ P p0, 1q.
Similarly, the same holds for f˚. Finally, since (1) fpyq “ f˚pyq, fpty, x1, . . . ,
xk`1uq “ f˚pty, x1, . . . , xk`1uq, fpx1q “ f˚px1q and, (2) fpxk`1q “ f˚pxk`1q
and fpx1q, fpxk`1q, and fpyq are not collinear, then using the same types of
arguments in Lemma 5, we get fpAq “ f˚pAq. This is what we wanted to
prove.
Hence, for all A P X˚ with cardinality k ` 1, we have fpAq “ f˚pAq. Based
on the induction, we have fpAq “ f˚pAq for all A P X˚. This completes the
proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
There are couple of steps in the proof. Defining the weak order:
Step 1: First, we define a binary relation ě over every two different elements
x, y P X by:
Case 1: If fpxq ‰ fpyq, we define x ě y ðñ fptx, yuq ‰ fpyq.
Case 2: If fpxq “ fpyq, then by the strong richness condition, we select
another point z P X, such that fptx, zuq R tfpxq, fpzqu. Hence, we have
fpzq ‰ fpyq. In this case, we define x ě y ðñ fptz, yuq ‰ fpyq.
To obtain reflexivity, for any x P X, we define x ě x.
Step 2: We prove thatě is a weak order. The reflexivity and the completeness
are trivial. We only need to establish the transitivity. Assume that x ě y, y ě
z. We will show that x ě z.
The proof is by contradiction. Therefore, assume that z ą x.
Case 1: Assume that fpxq, fpyq, fpzq are non-collinear. Since z ą x, based
on the way we defined ě, we have fpx, zq “ fpzq.
Consider the coalition tx, y, zu. By using the weighted averaging axiom over
the sub-coalitions tx, zu and tyu, the vector fptx, y, zuq should be on the line
joining fpyq and fptx, zuq (which is the same as fpzq). Similarly, by considering
the sub-coalitions tx, yu and tzu, fptx, y, zuq should be on the line passing
through fptx, yuq and fpzq. Since fptx, yuq ‰ fpyq and fptx, yuq, fpyq, fpzq
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are non-collinear, we have fptx, y, zuq “ fpzq. However, by considering the
sub-coalitions ty, zu, txu and the fact that fpty, zuq ‰ fpzq, this cannot be
happen. Therefore, x ě z.
Case 2: Assume that fpxq, fpyq, fpzq are collinear. By using the strong
richness condition, we can select a point u P X such that fpuq is not on the
line passing through fpxq, fpyq, fpzq, and also fptu, xuq R tfpxq, fpuqu (this
means that x „ u). First, using Case 1, by considering the coalitions tu, x, yu,
tu, x, zu, we have u ě y and z ą u. Since tu, y, zu are non-collinear, by using
case 1, we have z ą u, u ě y ñ z ą y. But this is a contradiction. Therefore,
x ě z.
The main part: proving fpAq “ fpMpA,ěqq.
Up to here, we show that ě is a weak order. Next, we will show that for any
coalition A P X˚ we have fpAq “ fpMpA,ěqq.
We use the letter H for the highest-ordered elements of A, and L for the rest.
In other words, H :“MpA,ěq, L :“ AzH. The proof is by a double-induction
on the cardinality of H and L. In Step 1, we will show that if x P X and L P X˚
are such that @z P L : x ą y, then we should have fptxu Y Lq “ fpxq.
In Step 2, we show that for a given coalition H P X˚, where all elements
of H are in the same equivalence class, and for all L P X˚, if for all
x P H, y P L : x ą y, then we have fpH Y Lq “ fpHq. Using these two steps,
we will finish the proof.
Step 1: Fix an element x P X. By induction on the cardinality of L, where
@y P L, x ą y, we prove that fptxu Y Lq “ fpxq.
We have already proved the case where |L| “ 1. Assume that for all |L| ď k
the result is correct. We will show that for all L with |L| “ k ` 1, the result
is also correct.
Fix a coalition L with |A| “ k ` 1 and such that @y P L, x ą y. Assume that
A “ ty1, . . . , yk`1u.
If for all y P L : fpyq “ fpxq, then using the weighted averaging axiom
fptxuYLq “ fpxq, which is what we wanted to prove. Similarly, if fpLq “ fpxq,
we have fptxu Y Lq “ fpxq.
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Therefore, consider the case that not all of them are the same and fpLq ‰ fpxq.
Using our definition of the line in the proof of Theorem 4, for each y P L we
consider linepfptxu Y pLztyuqq, fpyqq. Using the weighted averaging axiom,
for all y P L, fptxu Y Lq P linepfptxu Y Lztyuq, fpyqq. By using the induc-
tion hypothesis fptxu Y Lztyuq “ fpxq. Therefore, @y P L, fptxu Y Lq P
linepfpxq, fpyqq.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, we consider two separate cases.
Case 1: Consider the case where there exist two elements y1, y2 P L such that
fpxq, fpy1q, fpy2q are non-collinear. We use the same technique as in the proof
of Theorem 4.
We know that fptxu Y Lq P linepfpxq, fpy1qq as well as fptxu Y Lq P
linepfpxq, fpy2qq. Moreover, we know that fpxq, fpy1q, fpy2q are non-collinear.
Therefore, the intersection of the two lines should be fpxq. This shows that
fptxu Y Lq “ fpxq.
Case 2: If all the vectors fpxq, fpy1q, . . . , fpyk`1q are collinear. In this case,
the idea is to add a point x1 P X such that x1 „ x and fpx1q is not on the line
containing all fpxq, fpy1q, . . . , fpyk`1q. This is possible because of the strong
richness condition. By using the transitivity of the ě, @y P L : x1 ą y.
Fix a point y0 P L such that fpy0q ‰ fpxq. This is possible since we already
assumed that not all fpyq ,with y P L, are the same as fpxq.
Consider the coalition txu Y tx1u Y L. By using the weighted averag-
ing axiom and the sub-coalitions tx, Lzty0uu, tx1, y0u, we have fptxu Y
tx1u Y Lq P linepfptx, Lzty0uuq, fptx1, y0uqq. Using the induction hypothesis,
fptx, Lzty0uuq “ fpxq and fptx1, y0uq “ fpx1q. Therefore, fptxu Y tx1u Y Lq P
linepfpxq, fpx1qq.
Next, we show that fptxu Y tx1u Y Lq ‰ fpxq. Since x „ x1 and fpxq ‰ fpx1q,
we have fptx, x1uq ‰ fpx1q. Moreover, based on the way we selected the point
x1, fptx, x1uq is not on the line containing fpxq and tfpyq|y P Lu. Consider the
partition of txuY tx1uYL into tx, x1u and L. Based on the choice of the L, at
the beginning of Step 1, fpLq ‰ fpxq. Since fptx, x1uq ‰ fpxq, fpLq ‰ fpxq,
and fpxq, fpx1q, fpLq are non-collinear, we have fptxu Y tx1u Y Lq ‰ fpxq.
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Finally, by partitioning txu Y tx1u Y L into tx1u and txu Y L, the weighted
averaging axiom results in fptxu Y tx1u Y Lq P linepfptxu Y Lq, fpx1qq.
Therefore, fptxu Y Lq is on the line joining fptxu Y tx1u Y Lq and fpx1q.
However, we have already shown that fptxu Y tx1u Y Lq is on the line passing
through fpxq and fpx1q. Thus, fptxu Y Lq should be on the line joining fpxq
and fpx1q. However, the only intersection of linepfpxq, fpx1qq and the line
containing all the points fpxq, fpy1q, . . . , fpyk`1q is the point fpxq. Thus,
fptxu Y Lq “ fpxq, which completes the proof.
Step 2: In this step, by using induction on the cardinality of the set H, in
which all elements have the same order, we show that for any coalition L if
all elements of the set L have lower orderings compared to the elements of H,
then we should have fpH Y Lq “ fpHq.
Fix a set L. Based on Step 1, we know that for any x P X such that
@y P L : x ą y, we should have fptxu Y Lq “ fpxq. This is the starting point
of our induction. Assume that for all |H| “ k, we have fpH Y Lq “ fpHq.
We will show that for any |H| “ k ` 1, we have fpH Y Lq “ fpHq.
For any x P H, by the weighted averaging axiom over the sub-coalitions txuYL
and Hztxu, we have fpH YLq P linepfptxuYLq, fpHztxuqq. Based on step 1,
we know that fptxuYLq “ fpxq. Therefore, fpHYLq P linepfpxq, fpHztxuqq.
Similarly, by the weighted averaging axiom over the coalition H and its
sub-coalitions txu, Hztxu, we should have fpHq P linepfpxq, fpHztxuqq.
Consider two cases:
Case 1: Consider the case in which not all members of tfpxq|x P Hu
are collinear. Hence, there should be at least two elements x, y P H that
fpxq, fpHztxuq, fpyq, and fpHztyuq are not collinear. Therefore, the intersec-
tion of the lines joining fpxq, fpHztxuq and the line joining fpyq, fpHztyuq
can have at most one intersection. Since fpHq is on both lines, the unique
intersection should be fpHq. But fpH Y Lq is also on both lines. Hence, we
should have fpH Y Lq “ fpHq, which completes this case.
Case 2: Consider the case where all members of the set tfpxq|x P Hu are on
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a line. By using the strong richness condition, there exists an element x1 P X
such that fpx1q is not on that line. We consider the coalition tx1u Y H Y L.
By using the weighted averaging axiom over the sub-coalitions tx1u Y L and
H, we should have fptx1u YH Y Lq on the line joining fptx1u Y Lq and fpHq.
By the induction hypothesis, fptx1u Y Lq “ fpx1q. Hence, we should have
fptx1u YH Y Lq P linepfpx1q, fpHqq.
Similarly, by partitioning the set tx1u YH Y L into H Y L and tx1u, we have
fptx1u YH Y Lq P linepfpx1q, fpH Y Lqq.
Select an element x1 P H. By partitioning the coalition tx1u YH YL between
the sub-coalitions tx1, x1u and pHztx1uq Y L, using the weighted averaging
axiom, we obtain fptx1u YH Y Lq ‰ fptx1uq.
Finally, using (1) fptx1u Y H Y Lq P linepfpx1q, fpHqq, and (2)
fptx1uYHYLq P linepfpx1q, fpHYLqq, and (3) fptx1uYHYLq ‰ fpx1q, we have
linepfpx1q, fpHqq “ linepfpx1q, fpH Y Lqq. But the intersection of the last
line with the line containing all the elements of H, can have at most one
intersection. Therefore, fpH Y Lq “ fpHq, which completes the proof.
Completing the proof:
Consider a coalition H where all elements have the similar order. We consider
any two disjoint sub-coalitions H1, H2 P H, where fpH1q ‰ fpH2q. Using the
same technique of the previous part, we have fpH1 YH2q ‰ fpH1q.
By using the result of Theorem 4, we can get the appropriate representation in
each equivalence class. Also by using the result of the previous part, fpAq “
fpMpA,ěqq. The combination of these two results completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 6
The following two lemmas help us prove the theorem.
Lemma 7. Given any two linearly independent vectors v1, v2 in Rn, there
exists a neighborhood of v1 that any vector in that neighborhood is linearly
independent of v2. More generally, given any m vectors tv1, . . . , vmu such
that v1 is not in the linear space generated by the rest of the points, then
there exists a neighbor of v1 such that any point in that neighborhood is not in
spanptv2, . . . , vmuq.
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Proof. Since K “ spanptv2, . . . , vmuq is a closed set that is disjoint from the
vector v1, the distance between v1 and K should be nonzero. Hence, there
exists a neighborhood of v1 (for example the ball with radios distpv1, Kq{2
around v1) disjoint from K. As a result, any point in that neighborhood is
not in spanptv2, . . . , vnuq.
Lemma 8. Let v1, v2 P Rn be two linearly independent vectors and v “ αv1 `
p1 ´ αqv2, for some α P r0, 1s, is a vector between v1, v2. If the vectors vn “
αnv1`p1´αnqvn2 are such that αn P r0, 1s, vn2 Ñ v2, and vn Ñ v, then αn Ñ α.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. If it is not the case, there exists a sub-
sequence αnk of αn and some  ą 0, such that @ nk : αnk R Bpαq. Based
on compactness of r0, 1s, there exist a subsequence αnkj of αnk that is con-
vergent to some β P r0, 1s. Since αnk R Bpαq, we have β ­“ α. Based on
the assumption of the lemma, since the sequence vn is convergent to v, the
subsequence vnkj also converges to v. Similarly, v
nkj
2 converges to v2. Hence,
vnkj “ αnkj v1 ` p1 ´ αnkj qv
nkj
2 Ñ βv1 ` p1 ´ βqv2 and vnkj Ñ v. As a result,
βv1 ` p1 ´ βqv2 “ v “ αv1 ` p1 ´ αqv2. However, since v1, v2 are linearly
independent, α and β should be the same, which is a contradiction. The
contradiction shows that αn Ñ α.
Using the lemmas mentioned above, we will complete the proof. Based on
Theorem 2.4, there exist a unique weak order ě and a weight function w :







Let x P X be any given point. We need to prove that the weight function
is continuous around x and any point close enough to x has the same order,
respect to the weak order ě, as x.
To complete the proof, assume that xn P X and xn Ñ x. We are going to
prove that:
1) wpxnq Ñ wpxq,
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2) DN P N such that for all n ą N : xn „ x.
Proving these two completes the proof.
Based on the strong richness condition, there should be a point y P X such that
(1) fpxq, fpyq are linearly independent, and (2) fptx, yuq “ wpxqfpxq`wpyqfpyq
wpxq`wpyq ,
which means that x „ y. The reason is that by the strong richness condition,
there should be at least two other points y, z with the same order as x, such
that not all of fpxq, fpyq, and fpzq are collinear. This means that fpxq and
at least one of fpyq or fpzq should be linearly independent. Without loss of
generality, we assume that fpxq and fpyq are linearly independent.
Given any two points a, b P X, we define the function 1apbq as follows:
1apbq “
$&%1 if b ě a,0 Otherwise.
Consider the sequence of vectors fptxn, yuq. By Theorem 5, we have




1xn pyqwpyq`1ypxnqwpxnqfpyq. Based on continuity of the aggregation rule f ,
fpxnq Ñ fpxq and fptxn, yuq Ñ fptx, yuq. Since fpxq and fpyq are lin-









both wpxq and wpyq are strictly positive, we should have 1ypxnq Ñ 1 and sim-
ilarly 1xnpyq Ñ 1. This means that for large n, xn „ y. Since y „ x, for large
n we have xn „ x. This complete part 2 of the proof.






wpxnq`wpyq Ñ wpyqwpxq`wpyq .
This means that wpxnq Ñ wpxq, which proves that w is continuous at x.
Proving part 1 and 2 complete the proof.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 9
There are a couple of steps to prove the result.
Step 1: Assume that all signals arrive at time 1. By using Corollary 3, there
exists a unique (up to multiplication) weight function w : X˚ Ñ R``, such
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wpxq . By using the uniqueness of w and








Consider two signals x0, y0 P X, where fpx0q ‰ fpy0q. Let the timing of x0, y0
be Ttx0,y0upx0q “ 1, Ttx0,y0upy0q “ 2. Using the strict weighted averaging axiom,
there exists a λ P p0, 1q where fptx0, y0u, Ttx0,y0uq “ λfpx0q` p1´λqfpy0q. We
define q such that 1´λ
λ
“ q ˆ wpy0q
wpx0q .
In the rest of the proof, we show that these choices of w, q attain the repre-
sentation of Proposition 9.
Step 2: We show that for any signal z P X, the representation holds for the
coalition tx0, zu and for the timing function Ttx0,zupx0q “ 1, Ttx0,zupzq “ 2.
Case 1: Consider any signal z P X, such that tfpx0q, fpy0q, fpzqu are not
collinear. We form the coalition tx0, y0, zu with the timing Ttx0,y0,zupx0q “
1, Ttx0,y0,zupy0q “ 2, Ttx0,y0,zupzq “ 2. Using the strict weighted averaging
axiom, by considering the sub-coalitions tx0u and ty0, zu and the fact that y0
and z has the same timing, Lemma 6, in the proof of Theorem 4, shows that
the representation holds for the coalition tx0, zu with the timing Ttx0,zupx0q “
1, Ttx0,zupzq “ 2.
Case 2: Consider any signal z P X, such that tfpx0q, fpy0q, fpzqu are
collinear. By the richness condition, there exists a signal z1 P X such
that tfpx0q, fpy0q, fpzq, fpz1qu are not collinear. We consider the timing
Ttx0,y0,z,z1upx0q “ 1, Ttx0,y0,z,z1upy0q “ 2, Ttx0,y0,z,z1upzq “ 2, Ttx0,y0,z,z1upz1q “ 2.
The representation holds for the sub-coalitions tx, y, z1u (by Case 1) and
ty, z, z1u (since all have the same timing). Thus, by applying Lemma 6 first
on ty, z, z1u and then on tx, y, z1u, we can show that the representation holds
for the coalition tx0, zu with the timing Ttx0,zupx0q “ 1, Ttx0,zupzq “ 2.
Step 3: We show that the representation holds for any two signals u, v P X
with the timing function Ttu,vupuq “ 1, Ttu,vupvq “ 2.
Case 1: If tfpx0q, fpuq, fpvqu are non-collinear, then we consider the timing
function Ttx0,u,vupx0q “ 1, Ttx0,u,vupuq “ 1, Ttx0,u,vupvq “ 2. By applying Lemma
6 twice on tx0, uu and tx0, vu with their corresponding timings, we can show
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that the representation should holds for u, v P X with the timing function
Ttu,vupuq “ 1, Ttu,vupvq “ 2.
Case 1: If tfpx0q, fpuq, fpvqu are collinear, then by the richness condi-
tion, there exists a signal z P X such that tfpx0q, fpuq, fpvq, fpzqu are not
collinear. Consider the timing function Ttx0,u,v,zupx0q “ 1, Ttx0,u,v,zupuq “
1, Ttx0,u,v,zupvq “ 2, Ttx0,u,v,zupzq “ 2. By applying Lemma 6 for the sub-
coalition tx0, u, zu and their corresponding timing, shows that the represen-
tation holds for tu, zu and their timing Ttu,zupuq “ 1, Ttu,zupzq “ 2. Then,
by considering the coalition tu, v, zu and their corresponding timing, Lemma
6 shows that the representation holds for tu, vu and the timing function
Ttu,vupuq “ 1, Ttu,vupvq “ 2.
Step 4: In this step, we show that given any t P N, the representation holds
for any two signals u, v P X and the timing function Ttu,vupuq “ 1, Ttu,vupvq “ t.
The proof is by induction on t. By Step 3, the representation holds for t “ 2.
Assume that the representation holds for all t ă k with k ą 3. We will show
that it also holds for t “ k.
Case 1: If fpuq ‰ fpvq, then we consider a signal z P X such that
tfpuq, fpvq, fpzqu are not collinear. Let the timing function be Ttu,v,zupuq “
1, Ttu,v,zupvq “ k ` 1, Ttu,v,zupzq “ k.
Consider any wpu, 1q, wpv, kq, wpz, k´1q P p0, 1q such that fptu, v, zu, Tu,v,zq “
wpu, 1qfpuq ` wpv, kqfpvq ` wpz, k ´ 1qfpzq. By Lemma 6, induction hy-
pothesis, and the stationarity axiom, we have wpv,kq
wpu,1q “ wpv,kqwpz,k´1q ˆ wpz,k´1qwpu,1q “
pqwpvq
wpzqqpqk´2 wpzqwpuqq “ qk´1 wpvqwpuq . Thus, the representation holds.
Case 1: If fpuq “ fpvq, then we consider two signals z, z1 P X such that
tfpuq, fpvq, fpzq, fpz1qu are not collinear (which is possible by the richness
condition). Let the timing function be Ttu,v,z,z1upuq “ 1, Ttu,v,z,z1upvq “ k `
1, Ttu,v,z,z1upzq “ k, Ttu,v,z,z1upz1q “ k. By the uniqueness part of Theorem 4
and the induction hypothesis, the representation still holds in this case.
Step 4: Finally, for any coalition A P X˚ and any timing function TA, the
uniqueness of Theorem 4 and Step 4 establish that the representation should
hold with q, w.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Assume that the aggregation rule f : X˚ Ñ Rm satisfies the minimal agree-
ment condition and v P Rm is the direction on which all agents agree.
Consider two disjoint coalitions A,B P X˚ with the corresponding cardinal
utilities uA P UA and uB P UB. Assume that uAYB P UAYB is a cardinal utility
that represents the preference ordering of the union AY B. If uA “ uB, then
the result is trivial. Hence, consider the case uA ‰ uB.
First, by using the Farkas’ Lemma, we show that the extended Pareto is equiv-
alent to uAYB P Cone˝puA, uBq (which Cone˝puA, uBq denotes the interior of
the cone generated by uA and uB).
If uAYB P Cone˝puA, uBq, then there exist α, β ą 0 such that
uAYB “ αuA ` βuB. Therefore, for any x, y P L if uA ¨ x ě uA ¨ y and
uB ¨ x ě uB ¨ y, then uAYB ¨ x ě uAYB ¨ y. Similarly, if uA ¨ x ą uA ¨ y and
uB ¨ x ě uB ¨ y, then uAYB ¨ x ą uAYB ¨ y. This proves that the preference
ordering of AYB satisfies the extended Pareto axiom.
For the other side, if the utility of the union uAYB R Cone˝puA, uBq, then
Eα, β ą 0 such that uAYB “ αuA ` βuB. The Farkas’ Lemma guarantees that
there exists a vector z P Rm such that z ¨ uA ě 0, z ¨ uB ě 0 and z ¨ uAYB ă 0.
Consider a vector y P Rm that is in the interior of L. We select λ ą 0
such that y ` λz P L. This is possible since we assume that y is in the
interior of L. By defining x “ y ` λz, we get x ´ y “ λz. Since λ ą 0 and
z ¨ uA ě 0, z ¨ uB ě 0, we have uA ¨ x ě uA ¨ y, and uB ¨ x ě uB ¨ y. But since
z ¨ uAYB ă 0, we have uAYB and x ă uAYB ¨ y. But by the extended Pareto
axiom, this cannot be true. Therefore, uAYB P Con˝puA, uBq.
Now consider the intersection of H “ tx P Rm| x ¨ v “ 1u and Cone˝puA, uBq.
Since uA ¨ v ą 0 and uB ¨ v ą 0, there should be a unique uˆA P UA, uˆB P UB
both in H. It is trivial that Con˝puA, uBq “ Con˝puˆA, uˆBq.
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Since both uˆA.v ą 0 and uˆB.v ą 0, the intersection of the interior of the
cone generated by them and the linear variety H is the segment ruˆA, uˆBs “
tλuˆA ` p1 ´ λquˆB| λ P p0, 1qu. Since uAYB P Con˝puˆA, uˆBq, we should have
v.uAYB ą 0. Hence, there should be a uˆAYB P H representing uAYB. Therefore,
uˆAYB P ruˆA, uˆBs. This completes the proof.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 9
There are a couple of steps in the proof. Note that for any profile R P RX , and
for any coalition A Ď X, RA denotes the restricted sub-profile of the coalition
A.
Step 1: Fix a preference rˆ P Rx. Using the corollary 8, for any profile R P RX
such that R1 “ rˆ, we can uniquely define a weight function (which depends
on the full profile R) wRpiq : X Ñ R`` with wRp1q “ 1, such that for any









First, we show that for any individual i P Xzt1u and for any two profiles
Ra, Rb P RX with pRaq1 “ pRbq1 “ rˆ and pRaqi “ pRbqi, we have wRapiq “
wRbpiq. There are two separate cases:
Case 1: If pRaqi “ pRbqi ‰ rˆ, then using pRaqt1,iu “ pRbqt1,iu and the result of
corollary 8, we should have wRapiq “ wRbpiq.
Case 2: If pRaqi “ pRbqi “ rˆ, then by considering the definition of the
domain RX , which require the existence of three non-collinear preferences
in each profile, there should be a profile Rc P RX and two individual
j1, j2 P Xzt1, iu such that pRcq1 “ pRcqi “ rˆ, pRcqj1 “ pRaqj1 ‰ rˆ,
and pRcqj2 “ pRbqj2 ‰ rˆ. Using Case 1, we have wRcpj1q “ wRapj1q and
wRcpj2q “ wRbpj2q. Since pRaqti,j1u “ pRcqti,j1u and wRapj1q “ wRcpj1q,
using corollary 8, we should have wRapiq “ wRcpiq. Similarly, we have
pRbqti,j2u “ pRcqti,j2u and wRbpj2q “ wRcpj2q. Therefore, we should have
wRbpiq “ wRcpiq. Hence, we have wRapiq “ wRbpiq.
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By considering profiles of the form R P RX with R1 “ rˆ, we can define the
weight function w : Xzt1u ˆ Rx Ñ R`` such that wpi, Riq “ wRpiq for all
i P Xzt1u. By the result of Step 1, this function is well defined. Moreover, we
define wp1, rˆq “ 1.
At this point, for any preference profile R P RX with R1 “ rˆ and for any









Step 2: We need to define wp1, rq for all r P Rx. We have already fixed the
value wp1, rˆq “ 1. For any r P Rxztrˆu, let R P RX be a profile with R1 “ r
and R2 “ rˆ. By corollary 8, there should be a unique function wR : X Ñ R``
with wRp2q “ wp2, rˆq. We define wp1, rq “ wRp1q.
Notice that for any two profile Ra, Rb P RX with pRaq1 “ pRbq1 “ r and
pRaq2 “ pRaq2 “ rˆ, if we normalize the value of the wRap2q “ wRbp2q “ wp2, rˆq,
then we should have wRap1q “ wRbp1q. Hence, the value wp1, rq is independent
of the choice of the profile R.
At this point the function w : X ˆRx Ñ R`` is fully defined. We only need
to show that it works.
Step 3: Select any profile R P RX . We need to show that the representation
holds with the weight function defined above.
If R1 “ rˆ, by the result of Step 1 the representation holds. Hence, fix any
r P Rx where r ‰ rˆ. In the rest of the proof we show that the representation
holds for any R P RX with R1 “ r.
Similar to Step 1, using the corollary 8, for any profile R P RX such that
R1 “ r, we can uniquely define a weight function (depending on the full
profile R) w1Rpiq : X Ñ R`` with w1Rp1q “ wp1, rq, such that for any coalition










In the same manner as Step 1, for any two profiles Ra, Rb P RX with pRaq1 “
pRbq1 “ r and for every individual i P X, we should have w1Rapiq “ w1Rbpiq.
Hence, by considering profiles of the form R P RX with R1 “ r, we can define
the weight function w1 : Xzt1u ˆ Rx Ñ R`` such that for all i P Xzt1u :
w1pi, Riq “ w1Rpiq. By the result of Step 1, this function is well defined.
Moreover, we fix w1p1, rq “ wp1, rq.
For every preference profile R P RX with R1 “ r and for every coalition









To complete the proof, since we have wp1, rq “ w1p1, rq , it remains to show
that for all i P Xzt1u and for all r P Rx we have wpi, rq “ w1pi, rq.
Case 1: Since rˆ ‰ r and wp1, rˆq “ w1p1, rˆq, based on Step 2 we should have
wp2, rˆq “ w1p2, rˆq.
Case 2: Assume that r ‰ rˆ and i P Xzt1, 2u. Since N ě 5, based on definition
of RX , there exist Ra, Rb P RX such that pRaq1 “ rˆ, pRaq2 “ rˆ, pRaqi “ r and
pRbq1 “ r, pRbq2 “ rˆ, pRbqi “ r.
Since r ‰ rˆ, pRaqt2,iu “ pRbqt2,iu, and by Case 1 wp2, rˆq “ w1p2, rˆq, then we
should have wpi, rq “ w1pi, rq.
Case 3: Assume that r “ rˆ and i P Xzt1, 2u. Since N ě 5, we can select
an individual j P Xzt1, 2, iu. Based on the definition of RX , there exist
Ra, Rb P RX such that pRaq1 “ rˆ, pRaqi “ rˆ, pRaqj “ r and pRbq1 “ r, pRbqi “
rˆ, pRbqj “ r.
Since r “ rˆ ‰ r, pRaqti,ju “ pRbqti,ju, and by Case 2 wpj, rq “ w1pj, rq, then we
should have wpi, rq “ w1pi, rq.
Case 4: Finally, assume that i “ 2 and r ‰ rˆ. Select an individual j P
Xzt1, 2u. We consider profiles Ra, Rb P RX such that pRaq1 “ rˆ, pRaq2 “
r, pRaqj “ rˆ and pRbq1 “ r, pRbq2 “ r, pRaqj “ rˆ. By Case 3, we have wpi, rˆq “
w1pi, rˆq. Hence, since r ‰ rˆ and pRaqt2,ju “ pRbqt2,ju we should have wp2, rq “
w1p2, rq.
The last observation completes the proof.
